In English, French, German etc., the word ‘profound’ goes back to Latin profundus , meaning ‘deep.’ It is made up of the two elements pro ‘before’ and fundus ‘bottom.’ From earliest times it was used in the sense of “showing deep insight.” In that sense it is most often used referring to a subject or thought that demands deep study or thought. A “profound truth” is usually something that is not visible on first sight, is hidden or deep, and needs much study and thought to be understood. The Tibetan term for the noun is zab pa (adj. zab mo ). So we may speak of a ‘profound instruction’ (zab khrid ), a ‘profound view’ (zab mo lta ba ), a ‘profound meaning’ (zab mo’i don ), or a ‘profound path’ (zab lam ). Such a usage indicates depth and subtlety at the same time.

In the dGongs gcig we find a discussion of profoundness in the fifth chapter, where the general opinion is cited that “pith instructions of [the tantric practises of] channels and winds are more profound than [other teachings] such as the three vows.” Obviously the opinion is chiefly based on an understanding of profoundness as ‘most subtle.’ In this sense, the instructions on practises of the vehicle of mantra, such as on the channels and winds of the vajra body are considered profound, because they are extremely subtle practises. Here Jigten Sumgön says (5.14): “What is profound for others, is not profound [for us]; what is not profound [for others] is profound [for us],” and, as we shall see, he seems to build on an understanding of profoundness as something that reaches deep, is deeply grounded, and is therefore something that everything else is based upon, and without which other things could not even exist.

Thus Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa says in his commentary: “As the later result does not arise without a cause that is accomplished earlier, and as all the fortunes of the Cakravartin king first depend on his birth in the royal family and the gradual perfection of his physical and mental faculties, so, too, the vajrayana path of maturation and liberation, which is profound in [the view of] others, has no support if it lacks the vows of refuge, pratimoksha, and of the bodhisattvas, and so forth, which are not profound for others, and for the mantra vows to arise, the two lower vows are indispensable.”

The same idea is very clearly expressed in the Indian tantric siddha Advayavajra’s Kudrshtinirghatana with regard to the preliminaries (adikrama ) of tantric practise.^{♦ 1} According to Advayavajra, the preliminaries, consisting in this case of such things as taking refuge and the refuge vows, water offerings to Jambhala, cultivation of love, compassion, rejoicing and equanimity, mandala offering, etc., are not merely preliminary, but also primary, in the sense that they are a continuously constituted foundation of tantric practise (Wallis 2003: 204). That is certainly also Jigten Sumgön’s intention, as is clearly stated in dGongs gcig 2.14: “All stages of the path are practised in [each] single session.” Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa explains: “In that manner each session is preceded at the beginning by the [first part of the] stages of the path of the three [kinds of] beings, namely the [contemplation of] death, impermanence, the leisures and endowments that are difficult to find, cause and result, and the disadvantages of samsara.” The Rinjangma commentary refers in this context to a teaching by Jayülwa Zhönu Ö (1075-1138), received by Gampopa, according to which it is necessary to practise in the first morning session death and impermanence. Jayülwa is quoted with the words: “Forgetting to practise death and impermanence once in the morning, during that day you will aim only at this life!” Thus Rinchen Jangchub states that it is necessary to cultivate these thoughts from the depth of the heart, and then one contemplates karma, cause, result and the disadvantages of samsara, until all the higher and the lower realms of samsara are understood to be something like a fire-pit or filthy hole. Then one continues the session by cultivating, love, compassion, and the resolve for awakening, etc. Only after such profound fundamentals at the beginning of a session should one continue in the sutra vehicle with the actual practise of the two kinds of selflessness and in the mantra vehicle with the two stages of cultivation and completion.

Our commentaries disagree with those people who claim that such a way of practise came to Tibet only after Atisha. They say that such a method of practising is deeply rooted in the Kagyüpa teachings transmitted by Marpa Lotsava and Ngog Chöku Dorje.

Coming back to the general theme of profoundness, it is also a general opinion that the three higher tantric empowerments are profound, while the vase empowerment, that precedes them, is not. Here Jigten Sumgön maintains that the vase empowerment is the root and the higher empowerments are its branches. He said:

Even though [others] say that the higher supreme empowerments are profound,
I value the vase empowerment greatly.
It is like a basis, a container, and a body,
The other [empowerments] are its particulars.

“Therefore,” says Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa, “as middle and old age do not occur without childhood, similarly the intention is that what is not profound for others is profound [for us, and] it is the supporting ground of the other [subsequent teachings], and the higher storeys are not raised without the lower.” And Dorje Sherab sums up his comments saying: “The dGongs gcig teaches throughout just this topic. (…) If you understand it in this manner, you will understand all the topics of the dGongs gcig .” And Rinchen Jangchub summarises that if the lower Dharmas are lacking, one will not be able to pass beyond samsara even if one practises the profound topics of mantra. The best is certainly that all Dharmas are assembled, but even if the mantra elements that are held by others to be profound are lacking, one may still obtain happiness of samsara and nirvana based only on the pratimoksha. Thus, how profound can those practises of the channels and winds of the vajra body be, when they are useless without the preliminaries? And do we not have to value the preliminaries and pratimoksha most highly, if through practising only them one may obtain nirvana? “Therefore,” he says, “we teach that the lower is profound.”

Note
^{1. [See Glen Wallis (2003), “Advayavajra’s Instructions on adikarma ,” Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies , pp. 203-230. For Sanskrit editions of the text contained in his Advayavajrasamgraha , see Annual of the Institute for the Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism , Taisho University,” no. 10, (March 1988): 255-198, and Gaekwad’s Oriental Series , vol. 40, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927.]↩}

It amazes me again and again how the dGongs gcig 800 years ago engages in topics that are still discussed in the present day. The commentary of Dorje Sherab of the middle of the 13th century has the wonderful habit to always describe at the beginning of each new topic the general views of Tibetan Buddhists at that time. This serves directly the purpose to introduce the reason why Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo found it necessary to provide a correction of that view. But it also helps us to understand what the general understanding of Buddhism has been at that time.^{♦ 1} And most often we find exactly those same views that are criticised by Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo still current today. The dGongs gcig has in eight centuries not lost its freshness and topicality.

The topic I want to introduce today is found in the fifth chapter (5.9) and discusses the relation between the disciple’s faculties and the nature of the rituals that fit with those faculties. The general view is as follows. Engagement in vajrayana requires trainees of highest faculties. Within that supreme category there are again supreme, medium, and lower types. Those of lowest faculties among the persons of supreme faculties are to be consecrated into a coloured dust particle mandala, the medium types are consecrated with the help of a drawing on a piece of cloth, and the supreme ones only need to be supported by a mandala made of small heaps. Furthermore, those of lowest faculties will have to practise the complete stage of cultivation, the medium ones are to perform cultivation based on the seed syllable, and for the supreme ones instantaneous perfect awareness (skad cig dran rdzogs) suffices (which is synonymous with ‘instantaneous cultivation,’ dkrongs bskyed, i.e. ‘sudden’ and ‘all-at-once’ cultivation of the deity). Still furthermore, the lowest ones have to perform detailed practise rituals, the medium ones medium rituals, and the supreme ones do not need a ritual at all, because without mental constructions and having exhausted mind and phenomena, instantaneous perfect awareness practise is enough, or, if necessary, an abbreviated ritual can be performed. So far the general view.

Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo does not agree. In fact, he maintains the exact opposite (5.9): “All the detailed rituals are especially necessary for those of highest faculties.”

Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa explains that those trainees of medium and lowest faculties (among the supreme ones) hardly have the ability to comprehend detailed rituals. But for those of highest faculties, detailed rituals are indeed very important, since if someone in the best case has realised emptiness as cause and result, he will produce each individual quality through all of the various dependent originations of the ritual. Now, in order to begin to comprehend this point, we have to digress a little.

Ritual in the context of cause, result, and emptiness
Mahayana Buddhism, of which vajrayana is a special form, does not only aim for personal liberation. In fact, personal liberation can only be a preliminary step necessary to achieve the liberation of all sentient beings. The bodhisattva’s bodhicitta—the resolve to obtain awakening for the sake of all sentient beings—is a defining characteristic of the mahayana, and it stands at the beginning of that path. At the end of that path the bodhisattva has, motivated by loving kindness, compassion, and bodhicitta, cultivated inconceivably many qualities, which are necessary to be able to carry out those equally inconceivably many activities that achieve the benefit of the beings. In short, it is often said that one strives to accomplish the dharmakaya for one’s own sake and the two form-kayas (the sambhogakaya and the nirmanakaya) for the benefit of others.

All of our commentaries stress the fact that the inconceivable qualities and activities (embodied through the two form-kayas) arise as the result of the detailed rituals. But these qualities do not arise merely by reading those rituals out aloud. If that would be the case, there would be no need for supreme faculties in order to perform detailed rituals. Instead even a well trained parrot would be able to achieve those Buddha qualities. According to Dorje Sherab, however, the qualities only arise when the ritual is performed within a state of realised emptiness, since from within that state, all the specific dependent originations of cause and result will manifest that cause the Buddha qualities and activities to arise. This understanding is based on Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo’s teaching known as “the vital point of entering into cause and result as emptiness, and of emptiness arising as cause and result.”

Dorje Sherab dwells on this point in his introduction to the dGongs gcig.^{♦ 2} There he explains three aspects, of which the second one is the vital point mentioned above:

(1) applying cause and result to emptiness on the path (lam la rgyu ‘bras stong nyid du ‘jug pa)
(2) the arising of emptiness as cause and result on the path (lam la … stong nyid rgyu ‘bras su ‘byung ba)
(3) the non-dual existence of emptiness, cause, and result on the path (lam la … de gnyis su med par gnas pa)

(1) Applying cause and result to emptiness on the path
Of these three the first is the understanding that whatever arises from causes and conditions is unborn and empty of own existence. This is the truth of dependent origination of causes and conditions that is understood when one dwells in the nature, practising free from proliferation. That realisation is the ‘entering into the state of emptiness-equipoise’ (mnyam gzhag stong nyid). And that entering into the meditative state is called ‘the ground at the time of freedom from proliferation,’ which, as shall be clear, refers to the second of the four yogas of mahamudra (the meditative state of freedom from mental proliferation).^{♦ 3}

(2) The arising of emptiness as cause and result on the path
Secondly, and this is the relevant point for our discussion of detailed rituals, when one experiences the ‘one-taste’ (ro gcig) within the reality of dependent origination of causes and conditions, then all the fine details (spu ris) of causes and results each arise without loss from the state of emptiness. This is really a core of Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo’s teachings, namely, in short, that within emptiness nothing is lost. That is the reason why based on the two accumulations realisation is possible, and that is also the reason why the Drikungpa insists (like his teachers Phagmodrupa and like Gampopa) that whoever has realised emptiness has to pay greatest attention to cause and result. And that is also the reason why Mipham Rinpoche praised Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo, saying:

May as long as the world exists
the teaching of the victorious Drikungpa,
the Omniscient Lord and master of dependent origination,
continue through listening, reflecting, and practising.

This “arising of the fine details of cause and result” is the great stage of unity, and it is for instance called the ‘unity of the path’ (lam gyi zung ‘jug) or the ‘unity of [the stage of] learning’ (slob pa’i zung ‘jug). It is achieved on the path at the time of ‘single taste,’ which is the third of the four yogas of mahamudra.

(3) Non-dual existence of emptiness, cause, and result on the path
Thirdly, since such a unity, or ‘single taste,’ or non-dual existence is non other than ‘dependent origination,’ one understands that the ultimate original nature of the dependent origination of cause and result arises perfectly without mixing up all the individual ways of the arising of “this result from that cause.” Thus when that beginningless non-dual inseparability of ground, path, and result in all respects is actualised, the non-duality of meditative equipoise and post-meditative equipoise is achieved, which is also known as the ‘union of the result’ (‘bras bu zung ‘jug) or the ‘union of [the stage of] no more learning’ (mi slob pa’i zung ‘jug).’ And that union is also described as ‘the result at the time of no more learning,’ which is the fourth of the four yogas of mahamudra.

Ritual approach of beginners and advanced practitioners
The principle point of performing detailed rituals is, according to all our commentaries, to cause the arising of inconceivable many qualities and activities. There is, however, one further interesting aspect that is mentioned in some detail by Dorje Sherab. He states that with regard to the manners of practising the path, there is a principle (gtso bo) and an ancillary way (read: zhar ‘byung). The principle practise done by a beginner is the direct realisation of discriminating awareness (shes rab mngon [gsum du] rtogs [pa]). Those who have not yet obtained stability in that should perform the deity practise as an ancillary to their main practise. In that ancillary practise they merely remain aware (dran tsam) of the deity, while they chiefly work to realise discriminating awareness. For that purpose the stages of the ritual should be condensed. Then, once they have mastered emptiness, actualising all phenomena to be like space, they directly perceive within that state the dependent origination of cause and result (as explained in our digression above). And in that state they practise through detailed rituals the support of the celestial palace and the supported, namely the deities of the mandala with all the different body colours and their various attributes. To sum it up, Dorje Sherab says “thus through the vital point of entering into cause and result as emptiness, and of emptiness arising as cause and result, there is no chance that [the result] will not appear.”

Notes
^{1. [ You might object here that the presentation of the opinions of others in Tibetan texts is often quite polemical in nature and rarely a fair description of the actual view that is to be criticised. The purpose of citing them is usually that thereby they are presented in such a way, that they can be attacked more easily. Therefore, as a rule, it is always important to double check with the actual writings of the criticised ones. But here in our commentary by Dorje Sherab, the views that are cited are rarely of a particular opponent. Instead they are rather fairly widespread opinions that can occasionally even be found among his own fellow Kagyüpas.]↩}

^{2. [ Khog dbub, p. 231 f. of the 2007 Kagyu College edition.]↩}

^{3. [ The four yogas of mahamudra are (1) one-pointed concentration, (2) freedom from mental proliferation, (3) one-taste, and (4) no more practise/training.]↩}

The reasons given for the consumption of meat and alcohol in Buddhist tantric rituals and in everyday life, and the reasons for prohibiting the consumption of meat and alcohol have always interested me. I’ve been involved in many discussions about these points and I have also witnessed numerous discussions of Western converts, especially about meat, sometimes involving such folklore arguments as “Tibetans must eat meat because they can’t grow vegetables in the mountains,” or “a yogi eats meat to make a connection to the animal in future lives,” sometimes more sophisticated arguments involving analyses of texts of all three vehicles of Buddhism. It turned out that Jigten Gönpo took a pretty clear position on these points, but more on that below. Let us first look at some general topics.^{♦ 1}

1. Is Buddhism “pro-vegetarianism”?
Debates between vegetarians (in their many forms) and meat eaters tend to get tangled up, especially within a frame such as Buddhist spirituality, in what seem to be moral issues, or in apologetics of the above mentioned type. I think it is save to say that if people should ever consider themselves pro-vegetarianism because they are Buddhists, then this is due to reasons that are perhaps quite different from the reasons put forward in discussions within a Western cultural frame. Let us briefly review the chief topics in all three vehicles of Buddhism.

1.1. The avoiding of direct harm to others
Numerous Tibetan texts state that the basis of self-liberation (pratimoksha) is “to avoid harming other sentient beings, together with the mental basis for that.” That, of course, includes the killing of animals, “even down to the tiniest insects.” Why should one avoid the killing of any being? Because the doctrine of karma informs us that killing any sentient being would entail negative karmic consequences that cause us to remain in samsara and to fall into the unpleasant animal or hell realms. It should be noted, however, that the Buddha did not teach an extreme form of asceticism, where even a harm involuntarily inflicted to a tiny insect would have a karmic consequence. According to the systematised presentations of the abhidharma, four aspects must be complete in order to cause karmic consequences to occur: (1) basis or object: one must have a clear perception of the ‘victim,’ that is, accidentally stepping on an insect or mistaking e.g. a small snake for a rope (and stepping on it) is not a problem.^{♦ 2} (2) Intention: every karmically effective act must be preceded by a volition or intention. Without that, it is just an involuntary accident. (3) Preparation: this includes all the necessary activities of preparation up to the actual blow that kills the other sentient being. (4) Completion: to make an act complete in a karmic sense, one must recognise that one’s activity has led to the intended result—such as the death of the animal—and one has to feel a certain satisfaction about that. It is usually taught that if these four aspects are not complete, an act is more or less involuntary, accidental, or unconscious, and as a consequence there will be no or only a mild karmic retribution “as in a dream.”

Important for our discussion is that eating meat does not directly fulfil any of the above four aspects. By eating meat, one does not directly involve oneself in the killing of the animal—neither through perceiving the animal as such, forming the intention to kill it, carrying out the actual act, and feeling satisfied about it. This is, however, only so in the context of a consumer who buys “available meat” on the market. If, on the other hand, one instigates or even orders others to kill an animal, that is karmically speaking the same as doing the killing oneself. The Buddha has therefore carefully ruled that monks should not accept meat that was killed for their benefit, and that they should therefore inquire about the circumstances when being offered a meal that includes meat.

But not to be directly or indirectly involved in the killing is not the only reason why monks and nuns should distance themselves from the killer and the killing as far as possible. It is also the case that accepting meat that has been killed directly for one’s benefit wouldn’t fit well with the attitude of loving kindness that is to be cultivated. On the other hand, an ordained person has the important function to serve as a field of merit for lay people: the offering of food to the monks and nuns is the householders primary source of merit in early Buddhism. The ordained ones therefore must carefully balance out their avoidance of even very indirect involvement with killing and their important function as fields of merit for the householders.

In sum, those concerned with their own liberation can eat meat without obtaining the karmic consequences of killing, provided they only consume meat that was “already available.”

There were a number of taboo meats. These will also play a role in the ritual consumption of meat, such as elephant and horse meat that were taboo because of being symbols of royalty, dog and snake meat, which were taboo since these were seen as impure and revolting (Schmithausen 2005: 189). Prohibited was also the meat of the lion, tiger, leopard, bear and hyena. The reason was self protection: it was believed that these predators could smell if someone had eaten their kin and thus they would perhaps attack such a person (Harvey 2001: 159; McDermott 1989: 274).^{♦ 3}

1.2. The bodhisattva’s conflict with meat consumption
While among those, who sought to obtain liberation for themselves, the main problem of meat consumption was its proximity to the killing, which was circumnavigated by keeping a distance to the actual act of the killing, mahayana sutras such as the Lankavatara (p. 257, verse 12) deny that there is such a thing as ‘unproblematic meat.’ The verse states clearly that there never is ‘permitted’ or ‘pure meat.’ The argument that the buyer of the meat is not involved in the killing, because the meat is already available when he comes to the market, is not accepted anymore. The Lankavatara Sutra acknowledges explicitly that buying meat instigates killing:

If … meat would not be eaten by anybody, they [the butchers] would not destroy their [the animals’] cause of existence (nidanam). (LS 252,15-16)^{♦ 4}

Thus eating meat indirectly links up to the killing: buying the meat instigates the butcher to do his job.

But there are also other important ideas expressed now, for instance that the desire for the taste of meat is an addiction. And that, of course, is a direct cause for negative karma accumulated by the one who consumes the meat. Among the evil that ensues from that is birth among carnivorous animals such as lions, tigers, leopards, wolfs, hyenas, wild-cats, jackals and owls. Moreover, there is also the danger that one will be born from the wombs of awful demons, or from the womb of a female demon, such as a yakshasi, and into the tribe of meat-eaters (LS 252.5-10), and one is born ill smelling, contemptible, insane and so forth (LS 257-258, verse14). In short, it is clear that with such a rebirth it will be very difficult to return to human birth, let alone to a bodhisattva career.

The Lankavatara Sutra is also concerned with the fate of those who catch and slaughter fish and other animals, since to do that they must develop a certain cruelty and will therefore not be able to cultivate compassion (LS 252,16-253,9)—not to mention birth in hell as a retribution for the actual act of killing. The fate of these people, who are instigated to do what they do by those who buy and consume the meat, should concern the bodhisattva, because instead of being able to lead these people to awakening, they slip away into evil fates.

There are also two further spiritual concerns for the bodhisattva. First of all, eating meat contradicts their nature of compassion and loving kindness, because the beings are shaking with horror when they are about to be slaughtered, and also when they smell the bad smell of meat eaters (LS 246,11-13, 252,13-14 and 258, verse 23). Secondly, to eat the meat of other beings is to eat one’s former mothers (245,10-246,4), and also the future Buddhas, because one eats the bodily receptacle of the spiritual principle that is known in these sutras as ‘Buddhanature’ (tathagatagarbha). (Seyfort Ruegg 1980: 236).

In sum, according to these sutras, bodhisattvas must consider themselves linked up to the actual killing by eating meat, they will suffer severe consequences themselves, and they cause others to suffer by instigating them to continue their evil craft and trade. All those Tibetan lamas who gave up eating meat refer to one or several arguments given in these sutras for becoming vegetarians.^{♦ 5}

[Brief update:] In the Mahaparinirvana Mahayanasutra the Tathagata is asked about the permission he granted the Shravakas to eat meat if it is completely pure in the three aspects of neither having seen, heard, or suspected that an animal has been killed for your sake specifically:^{♦ 7}

Excalted One, how did you permit to eat meat that is completely pure in three aspects? [The Tathagata] proclaimed: “[I permitted meat] that is completely pure in three aspects to gradually make the basis of the training [of complete vegetarianism] more strict. Today I discard [that permission}.”

In other words, to permit meat that was pure in the three aspects was only a provisional means. Ultimately, in the Mahayana, eating meat is prohibited. [End of update.]

1.3. Meat and mantra
There is some evidence that the consumption of meat and alcohol was prohibited in lower tantras, such as in ‘action tantra.’ Jamgon Kongtrul reports that the Susiddhi Tantra teaches 18 pledges, of which the 10th says: “do not eat food that is not permitted,” and the great Drukpa Kagyü master Padma Karpo explains that these include meat and alcohol (Kongtrul 1998: 233, 461 n. 86). I have not seen any arguments for this prohibition (but I have also not extensively searched for them here). One might assume, though, that these prohibitions have to do with purity and proper discipline, because at the same time such texts also teach to wash oneself and keep clean, and not to use garlic, onions, radish, sour drinks and so forth.

On the other hand, it is well known that meat and alcohol is prescribed in the highest yoga tantras for certain ritual purposes. Many of these tantras mention for instance the necessity to consume the ‘five meats’ and ‘five nectars.’ It should be noted, however, that these are not the regular meats one can buy on the market, because they are exactly those above mentioned taboo foods, namely the meat of cow, dog, horse, elephant, and of human beings. The great Patrul Rinpoche says (p. 190): “These five kinds of meat are undefiled by harmful action because they are all creatures which are not killed for food.” That is to say that the five kinds of meat used in the rituals of the highest yoga tantras are to be gathered from animals and human beings that have died of natural causes. But not only that. The Samputa Tantra, for instance, which is an important tantra belonging to the cycle of Hevajra and Cakrasamvara, says:^{♦ 6}

Having drunk dog, donkey, camel, and elephant blood, one should regularly feed on their flesh. Human flesh smeared with the blood of all species of animals is beloved. Entirely vile meat full of millions of worms is divine. Meat rendered putrid by shit, seething with hundreds of maggots, mixed with dog and human vomit, with a coating of piss—mixed with shit it should be eaten by the yogin with gusto.

Wether such passages are to be read literally or not is not the point of our discussion here. But what is quite clear is that the meat mentioned here for consumption by the yogi is not procured by slaughtering a living being, and it is not meat that is normally eaten to allay one’s hunger for food. In a provisional sense, the flesh of animals who have died naturally might be consumed by the yogi “in order to shatter arrogance about one’s social status and personal pride” (Kongtrul, p. 255). This, however, only makes sense when one lives in a country (such as India), where the consumption of such foods is a taboo. If one would culturally translate such a praxis into the Western cultural sphere, where all kinds of meat and alcohol are publicly consumed, one would probably have to eat human flesh and drink excrements to achieve the same result of being seen (and seeing oneself) as an ‘impure’ outcast. Dharmashri (as quoted by Kongtrul) also mentions that in a definite (and thus not literal) sense ‘to eat meat and drink alcohol’ actually means to stabilise inner bliss etc. and thus refers to yogic practises (and not to eating and drinking), and Kongtrul adds that in reality such training is done on the forth level (bhumi) of the bodhisattvas.

Another interesting ritual aspect is the tantric offering of ‘red meat’ by placing it on the mandala or offering it to the wrathful Dharma protectors. In this context, Patrul Rinpoche refers to Dagpo Rinpoche (Gampopa), who said (p. 191):

Taking the still warm flesh and blood of a freshly slaughtered animal and placing it in the mandala would make all the wisdom deities faint. It is also said that offering to the wisdom deities the flesh and blood of a slaughtered animal is like murdering a child in front of its mother.

And Patrul Rinpoche continues:

If you perform rituals like the offering prayer to the protectors using only the flesh and blood of slain animals, it goes without saying that the wisdom deities and the protectors of the Buddha’s doctrine, who are all pure Bodhisattvas, will never accept those offerings of slaughtered beings laid out like meat on a butcher’s counter. They will not even come anywhere near. Instead, powerful evil spirits who like warm flesh and blood and are ever eager to do harm will gather round the offering and feast on it.

Finally it is often said that meat and alcohol are necessary substances to be consumed in a tarntric feast (Skr. ganacakra, Tib. tshogs ‘khor). In general, Jigten Sumgön says in a letter to all of his disciples (vol. 3, p. 377):

Om Svasti. The precious guru said: “I offer this to my disciples residing in all directions. If the ones who say that they are my disciples destroy the teachings by calling eating meat and drinking alcohol ‘tantric feast,’ I have no connection with them. They injure the precious teachings of the Buddha. Since that is not in accordance with the fourteen and fifteen pledges of secret mantra and their limbs, these [peoples’] pledges have been corrupted. They have deceived Phagmodrupa, the precious protector of the three worlds. Since that is not in accordance with [the guru’s] life of liberation, they slander those [noble] beings of the past. (…) Please take this to heart!”

And in another text (vol. 6, p. 132 f.) he does teach the preparation of the five meats and five nectars, but he says that this is done placing oneself first in the sameness of mahamudra, where all good, bad, clean, and filthy things are of one taste, without any deviation from that. Jigten Gönpo’s main thrust in his teachings on these matters has always been to present a single intention (dgongs gcig), emphasising the unity of the teachings, for instance when he said (5.24):

That which is virtue in the vinaya is virtue also in the mantra, and that which is non-virtue [in the vinaya] is non-virtue [also in the mantra].

This is in the commentaries explicitly explained in connection with the use of alcohol by tantric yogis. Dorje Sherab states in his commentary on this point (Sobisch 1998: 379 ff.):

Through the three syllables Om A Hum one transforms the colour [of alcohol] and [it is] like milk; one transforms the smell and taste and [it is] like salt-water; one transforms the potency and by merely drinking [this nectar] remaining free from intoxication and drunkenness [one is] able to realize the innate simultaneously arisen primordial wisdom. For example, the great brahmin [Saraha] resorted to the alcohol of the skull cup, and if something such as the arising [of] the realisation of the mind itself, [i.e.] mahamudra, occurs, [that] was taught [by the Buddha] as the pledge of mantra. If such [a thing] occurs, how could it be prohibited even in the vinaya and again for the non-tantric [mahayana] tradition? [It] is a great absolute permission!

Thus when the tantric adept is indeed able to transform the alcohol held in the receptacle of the skull cup into a blazing, whitish ambrosia whose consumption immediately awakens primordial wisdom, than he must drink it, whether he is an ordained monk or not. But if he is not able to do that, even if he is a yogi, he is not permitted to drink it—because it is alcohol, and not nectar. Dorje Sherab also points out that alcohol as such has never been taught in the tantras as nectar. Instead the tantras speak of excrement, urine, blood, semen, and human flesh (Kongtrul 472 n. 145) when they refer to the ‘five nectars.’ Thus Dorje Sherab explains that if one thinks that one has to use alcohol in a tantric feast …

… one [should] equalize [alcohol and excrements], and having mixed as much alcohol as one will drink with that great nectar [i.e. excrement], one should drink it. If one cannot bear that because of its stench, the nectar does not exist anywhere (…).

Notes
^{1. [I would like to thank my student Louise Broskov Hansen for the many interesting discussions we’ve had during the fall semester of 2012. Many of the points mentioned here came up in our B.A. colloquium and have been incorporated into her thesis, which she defended successfully in January 2013. She has also provided all references to the Lankavatara Sutra.]↩}

^{2. [Interestingly Jigten Gönpo points out in another context that such behaviour is not entirely without negative consequences, in so far as such ‘accidents’ are caused by a lack of awareness, which itself leads to negative consequences. These consequences, however, are not caused directly by the accidental deed, but by one’s lack of awareness.]↩}

^{3. [I owe these references to Louise.]↩}

^{4. [Translation from Sanskrit by Louise Boskov.
]↩}

^{5. [A small sample of famous vegetarians in Tibet that I came across in my readings includes Yang Gönpa, Jonang Dolpopa, Lama Zhang, Karmapa VII Chödrag Gyatsho, Jetsun Dragpa Gyaltshen, Patrul Rinpoche, and Jigten Gönpo.]↩}

^{6. [This passage was published by Christian Wedemeyer in his new book Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism. I have not yet seen the actual print, but in a draft it appeared right at the beginning of the introduction.]↩}

^{7. I owe reference to this passage to a very interesting article by Yangxian Jia (Nyangshem Gyal), “The Sectarian Formation of Tibetan Vegetarianism: Identifying the First Polemic on Meat-eating in Tibetan Literature,” Journal of Tibetology, pp. 128-152.
’Phags pa yongs su mya ngan las ’das pa chen po’i mdo, Derge, vol. 54, fol. 54r f. , Lhasa, vol. 54, fol. 74v: bcom ldan ‘das/_’o na ji ltar mu gsum yongs su dag pa’i sha bza’ bar gnang lags/_bka’ stsal pa/_mu gsum yongs su dag pa ‘di ni/_ngas rim gyis bslab pa’i gzhi bsdam pa’i phyir deng ngas bor ro/. ↩}

Bibliography
Harvey, Peter (2001) An introduction to Buddhist Ethics; foundations, values and issues, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kongtrul, Jamgön (1998) Buddhist Ethics, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications.

McDermott, James P. (1989) “Animals and humans in early Buddhism,” Indo-Iranian Journal 32, no. 4 (Oct.1989), 269-280.

Patrul Rinpoche (1998) The Words of My Perfect Teacher, Boston: Shambhala.

Schmithausen, Lambert (2005) “Meat-eating and nature: Buddhist perspectives,” Supplement to the Bulletin of the research institute of Bukkyo University.

Seyfort Ruegg, David (1980) “Ahimsa and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism,” Buddhist Studies in Honor of Walpola Rahula, London: Gordon Fraser, 234-241.

Sobisch, Jan-Ulrich (2002) Three-Vow Theories in Tibetan Buddhism: A Comparative Study of Major Traditions from the Twelfth Through Nineteenth Centuries, (Contributions to Tibetan Studies 1), Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag.

I found an interesting short passage in Dorje Sherab’s commentary (on dGongs gcig 4.15) where he deals with Jigten Gönpo’s attitude towards the followers of the so-called ‘lower vehicle’ (which we should really rather call the ‘vehicle of shravakas’), namely the ‘hearers’ (shravaka) and ‘solitary Buddhas’ (pratyekabuddhas). It might be objected that this can only be a ‘theoretical attitude,’ because shravakas and a lower vehicle did not exist in Tibet. But according to Jigten Gönpo’s definition of the difference between the ‘lower’ and the ‘greater vehicle’ (in dGongs gcig 1.21), one might have second thoughts. The definition says: “The difference between hinayana and mahayana is the resolve for awakening that is cultivated.” ‘Resolve’ refers here to the special resolve for awakening for the sake of all sentient beings. The shravakas do also resolve to obtain awakening, yet their primary motivation is their revulsion at samsara, the resultant renunciation, and their desire to obtain liberation for themselves, not their compassion for others. Thus as long as one has not cultivated the bodhisattva’s resolve with the wish to liberate all beings, one is still, according to this definition, on the level of a shravaka.

There seem to be some instances of denigrating images and language against shravakas in the mahayana (calling their vehicle ‘lower’ being just one example). In the Mahayanasutralamkara (13.15) we read for instance:

[For] the intelligent [bodhisattvas] to stay continuously in hell
is not an obstruction of the stainless, vast awakening.
The very blissful remaining [that is taught] in the other [i.e. lower] vehicles, however,
the thought of great ease, and the benefiting of oneself, causes obstructions.

In short, being in hell does not obstruct great awakening, but being a shravaka does. And in tantric literature we might read that the tantric yogi is not allowed to stay “more than seven days among shravakas.”^{♦ 1} It is apparent that there has been a tangible tension between these groups in India. On the other hand, we have reports from Chinese Buddhist pilgrims in India like Fa-shien (early 5th c.) and Hsüan-tsang (7th c.), who noticed that in many Indian monasteries shravakas continued to live side by side with mahayanists.^{♦ 2}

The tension found its expression also in derogatory statements about the spiritual levels achieved by shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. In our commentary, Dorje Sherab reports that there were people who claimed that “even the first [bodhisattva] level is not seen by shravakas and pratyekabuddhas.” In contrast to that he presents Jigten Gönpo’s vajra utterance 4.15, according to which “up to the sixth [bodhisattva] level, the realisation is in common with the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas.” In other words, no matter how different the two groups might have thought, lived, and practised, a substantial part of their achievements were the same. To illustrate that, Dorje Sherab borrows from the Dashabhumikasutra (Derge vol. 36, fols. 233v ff.) the example of the prince (= bodhisattva) and the minister’s son (= shravaka). He says:

Take, for instance, a prince and the son of a minister, who are of the same age. Are their qualities different? As the young prince outshines even an old minister through his [blood]-line (rigs), whoever possesses the resolve for awakening is of the mahayana Buddha family, and therefore even the beginning bodhisattva outshines all shravakas and pratyekabuddhas through his family.

This goes back to the idea of different Buddha families, as for instance mentioned in Gampopa’s Jewel Ornament:^{♦ 3}

The cut-off family, the dubious-family,
the shravaka-family, the pratyekabuddha-family,
and the family of followers of the mahayana way of life …

Quotes like these are found in mahayana sources that seek to establish that entering into the family of bodhisattvas turns one into a being with much greater potential than the shravakas possess. Thus even a beginning bodhisattva outshines through his sheer potential all others. Yet, as Dorje Sherab continues:

Through realisation they [i.e. the bodhisattvas] are not able to outshine them [i.e. the shravakas] up to the sixth level, like the deeds of a young prince does not outshine the deeds of great ministers. Having reached the seventh level and upwards they are able to outshine them through both family and realisation.

In other words, the superiority of the bodhisattvas over shravakas (and pratyekabuddhas) up to the sixth bhumi is only due to their potential, not through their actual realisation. Nevertheless the bodhisattva must be worshipped and venerated by the others, as Dorje Sherab explains:

Secondly, even if the sons of the king and the minister are of equal age, the prince is exalted through his family. Therefore the minister’s son must pay his respect and venerate him. Similarly, here [shravakas, pratyakabuddhas and bodhisattvas] are of the same realisation, but shravakas and pratyakabuddhas must worship the bodhisattvas and take them as their gurus.

However, Dorje Sherab adds here that the shravaka’s inferior position is no reason for the bodhisattva to denigrate him:

It is also taught that bodhisattvas must speak honourably (zhe sa bya) to shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. Similarly as soon as the prince is born, the minister who has grown old (na tshod tshad du phyin pa) must venerate and worship him. But [the prince] too should not speak dishonourably to the minister. Even though a bodhisattva, who has comprehended the resolve for awakening for the first time, is not particularly distinguished, the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas—even if they have practised the pure discipline for many hundred thousand eons—must pay homage to him and venerate him. [But] it is taught that the bodhisattva, too, must speak honourably to them.

Even though we find in this passage the usual ranking that is based on membership in the Buddha-families, two aspects are remarkable. First, that Jigten Gönpo teaches (in contrast to some other masters) that bodhisattvas, shravakas, and pratyekabuddha have the same realisation up to the sixth bhumi,^{♦ 4} and secondly, that the bodhisattva should speak honourably to them.

That this latter point is a larger issue for Jigten Gönpo can been gleaned from a passage of his collected teachings, where he says:^{♦ 5}

For someone who, after taking refuge to the three jewels, has entered the gate of the precious teachings of the Tathagata, completely all the practises of the different trainings are similarly ‘Dharma.’ But some people defame the instructions of the Tathagata by claiming “only this teaching of mine is Dharma, what others are practising is not Dharma,” or “Nyingmapa-mantra is not Dharma,” or “the practise of the siddha Vajrapani is not Dharma,”^{♦ 6} or “amanasikara is not Dharma,”^{♦ 7} etc. This causes only desire, hatred, and cognitive misorientation for them. The maturation of such activity is the result ‘samsara’ and ‘lower realms.’ Since such results are wailful, you should never denigrate any teaching!

Such an attitude is, no doubt, in sharp contrast to that of some other writers, especially in the philosophical genres. A classical case I have seen is a ‘system of tenets’ (siddhanta, Tib. grub mtha’) text, where one writer accuses another one of not even being a Buddhist—and that while they were both not only mahayanists, but also fellow madhyamikas! The fault of the accused was to belong to the other branch of madhyamaka!♦ 8 Jigten Gönpo, on the other hand—and I hope to provide many further examples in the future—always seems to emphasise the unity of the Buddhist teachings. Thus, to take only a few examples from the first chapter, he teaches that

– while it is true that there are 84.000 teachings, they are still all one as a method of achieving Buddhahood (1.2);
– within each of the three wheels of the Buddha’s teachings, all three are complete (1.5);
– neither mantra nor sutra should be lacking, because complete awakening can only be obtained through a combination of both (1.23);
– all vows, whether of individual liberation (pratimoksha), of the bodhisattvas, or of the mantra practitioners, have the same single vital topic, namely their avoiding the ten non-virtuous actions (1.24).

And at the end of that chapter he summarises all by stating: “The intention of the Buddha is the single family and the single vehicle” (1.29). Hence his teaching is known as “The Single Intention” (dGongs gcig).

He is also prepared to admit that “there exist much that is virtuous by nature to be practised in [the systems of] the non-Buddhists (mu stegs pa) too” (1.19). And not only do the non-Buddhists have many virtuous practises that should be followed by Buddhists, too, but some things are even better understood outside of Buddhism! Here he has in mind for instance the medical specialists, who sometimes have a very profound understanding of how the rough and subtle channels of the body, the primary and secondary winds that move in them, etc., and their vital essences are, and they also know how to bestow life (‘tsho ba’i srog ster ba) in very profound ways (5.13).

Notes

^{1. [Alexander Berzin, Taking the Kalachakra Initiation, Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1997, p. 110. Berzin explains, however, that here ‘shravaka’ means “anyone who trivializes or makes fun of tantra,” which is a nice explanation, but doesn’t really reflect the actual attitude of the usual tantric towards the ‘lower’ vehicle.]↩}

^{2. [Akira Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism: From Shakyamuni to Early Mahayana, transl. Paul Groner, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993, p. 244.]↩}

^{3. [The Jewel Ornament of Liberation by sGam-po-pa, translated and annotated by Herbert V. Guenther, Boston and London: Shambala, 1986, p. 3. See also the various books and articles by D. Seyfort Ruegg, such as his dissertation La théorie du tathagatagarbha et du gotra (Paris 1969) and “The Meaning of the Term Gotra and Textual History of Ratnagotravibhaga,” BSOAS 39 (1976) 341-363.]↩}

^{4. [The reason for that is chiefly that the achievements on those bodhisattva levels, such as realisation of the four noble truths, of dependent origination, and of cessation, are also taught in the sutras for shravaka-arhats and pratyekabuddhas.]↩}

^{5. [This passage can be found in the Dehra Dun edition of Jigten Gönpo’s collected works in vol. 1, p. 181.]↩}

^{6. [This refers to those who claim that the tantras are not part of the Buddha’s teachings.]↩}

^{7. [This refers to those who claim that mental inactivity is not Dharma. This topic has been debated during the great debate at Samye between the Chinese master Hwashang Mohoyen and the Indian master Kamalashila.]↩}

^{8. [See D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Jo nang pas: A School of Buddhist Ontologists According to the Grub Mtha’ sel gyi me long,” JAOS 83 (1963) 84- f., where Thu’u-bkwan Blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma (1737-1802) from A-mdo argues at length that the teachings of the Jo-nang-pa are exactly the same as those of the non-Buddhist sects.]↩}

In our dGongs gcig commentaries we find several samples of quotes that are usually offered by those people who hold that a bodhisattva has the power, or permission, to override non-virtue. The most famous quote is perhaps Shantideva’s Bodhicaryavatara 5.84cd:

The Merciful One through far-sightedness allowed them [i.e. the bodhisattvas]
even [these activities] that are prohibited [for others].

Well known is also Candragomin’s Bodhisattvasamvaravimshaka (D fol. 167v):

Because they possess compassion and out of love,
there is no fault for those with a virtuous mind.

And again Shantideva’s Bodhicaryavatara 1.35:

Even through a great [misdeed] no evil can arise for the sons of victors,
[instead] virtue increases by itself.

And Phagmodrupa is quoted with these words:

For the great bodhisattvas who perform great beneficial acts for the sake of others and dwell on the [bodhisattvas’] stages and paths, the seven non-virtuous [deeds] of body and speech are permitted, but the Great Sage, the Lord of Dharma, declared that there is never an opportunity and time when wrong views are permitted.

Typical is also the reference to the well known story of the greatly compassionate captain for whom killing was (alledgedly) no fault, the story of king Kanakavarna for whom there was no fault despite his taking of things not given, and the story of the brahmin Jyotis for whom there was no fault despite his breaking of celibacy (some of these stories will be discussed below).

The general understanding is portrayed in the Rin byang ma. Accordingly the beginning bodhisattva engages in the disciplined conduct of the vows in order to abandon the obscuration of karma. This is done, as in the case of the Buddha, for the duration of one immeasurable eon and until the first bodhisattva level (bhumi) is obtained. Then,

after one has gained strength in that, chiefly the gathering of virtuous factors is practised in order to accomplish completely all ways of (A) making offerings to Buddha, the Exalted One, through the disciplined conduct of the bodhisattva’s dharanis, samadhis, supernormal displays, super-perceptions, and ten powers (dbang rnam pa bcu), and (B) in order to accomplish completely all ways of methods of purifying the Buddhafields and of ripening and liberating sentient beings.

This is again done for the duration of one immeasurable eon and until the eighth bodhisattva level is obtained. “Since thereafter the bodhisattva chiefly brings about the benefit of others, the disciplined conduct of benefiting sentient beings is practised” on the three pure bodhisattva levels again for the period of one immeasurable eon. After obtaining the first bodhisattva level, the bodhisattva is, according to this view, “free from the impediment of falling back (log ltung).” From the eighth bodhisattva level upwards the bodhisattva turns into an expert with regard to methods and “guides the trainees through fitting means in accordance with [the trainees’] aspiration on the path.” If he is, however, not able to place the trainee on the path through the pure (i.e. virtuous) means alone,

that bodhisattva, considering the benefit of others, must guide those sentient beings also by way of the seven non-virtuous actions with body and speech, such as killing, and it is said that no faults arise for him.

In contrast to that, Jigten Gönpo states (dGongs gcig 4.6): “The ‘non-virtuous that does not become a fault’ is not permitted.” This vajra-statement is crucial for the understanding of all of Jigten Gönpo’s teachings of Bodhisattva conduct. I think it is, according to him, first of all necessary to differentiate between ‘being a fault’ and ‘being not permitted.’ The Rin byang ma has in this regard the very clear statement that an activity may be permitted to great bodhisattvas, but faults do arise nonetheless. In such a case, a non-virtuous deed is performed by the bodhisattva, such as killing, “through which, however, [sentient beings’] ripening and liberation of mind occur,” yet “even the Buddha is unable to prevent [the arising of] the result of actions such as killing, because that is the nature.” The crucial point is that the bodhisattva must be able to bear the consequences of his deeds, since such conduct

is permitted from the perspective of whether the bodhisattva[’s conduct] deteriorates through the sufferings of the result of that karma, namely the three lower realms, and whether he is able to bear [the suffering of those realms]. Thus faults arise. Ask yourself: “Will I be able to bear [the suffering] or not?” There is no other question than analysing whether one will be overpowered by sufferings such as hunger, thirst, and freezing and whether one’s virtuous Dharma conduct will [as a result] deteriorate. [Such conduct] is permitted to those bodhisattvas who have obtained tolerance with regard to phenomena, who are ready to remain in hell for immeasurable eons for the sake of each single sentient being, but whose virtuous Dharma conduct would [at the same time] not deteriorate the least through these sufferings.

The rDo sher ma summarises: “the bodhisattvas who have obtained ‘endurance’ are able to remain for limitless eons in the hell of unending torment for the sake of every single sentient being. For such [bodhisattvas] it is allowed [to engage in non-virtuous conduct in order to ripen the beings].” And: “if a single benefit of sentient beings arises because [a bodhisattva] bears the ripening for the sake of each sentient being, that is holding others more dear than oneself.” But how is that ‘endurance’ obtained, through which a bodhisattva is able to bear suffering and avoids at the same time the deterioration of the pure conduct? The rDo sher ma states:

The root of not losing the benefit of oneself and others like that is emptiness and compassion. Therefore, if one in this way familiarises oneself with the quintessence of emptiness and compassion, it occurs like that. Having obtained steadfastness with regard to that, even through the negative results of having engaged forcefully [e.g. engaged in killing], it occurs that the ripening and liberation of sentient beings is thereby caused. It is necessary that with regard to that one makes the root of emptiness and compassion stable.

Thus we can indeed speak of a ‘permission’ here, but only when the bodhisattva is able to bear the consequences of the non-virtuous deed that he performs in order to ripen and liberate sentient beings and only when the ensuing sufferings do not destroy the basis of his bodhisattvahood. An example of such an action is the killing of the deceptive merchant by the merciful captain. When the deceptive merchant is about to kill the other 500 merchants, the merciful captain kills him to prevent the ripening of the bad karma of killing 500 people in him. Thereby not only is the deceptive merchant now without that karma, but also no other person has to kill him and to bear the consequences. Yet the merciful captain himself has to bear the suffering of hell for committing a non-virtuous deed, and even when he is later born as the Buddha himself, a final consequence of that karma is that he pierces his foot with an acacia thorn (Skt. khacira).

It should be noted, however, that according to some later commentators not only did the merciful captain not commit a fault, but rather gathered plenty of merit (such an interpretation can be found e.g. in the Bodhisattvabhumi, Wogihara 166-9-12). But Jigten Gönpo does not follow that interpretation. Two things are certain for him in this context. Firstly, that the killing is necessarily a non-virtuous act, even though it is done out of a generally compassionate motivation. Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa states in the context of dGongs gcig 4.7: “If the great merciful captain, even though [his] motivation at the time of the cause is the benefit of beings, does not cultivate the motivation at the time [of the actual deed, namely] hatred, he cannot stab [with his] weapon.” Secondly it is clear for Jigten Gönpo that such an act must therefore have painful consequences for the bodhisattva. In this he can rely on a sutra from the Ratnakuta sutra collection, namely the Jñanottarabodhisattva-pariprccha-parivarta Mahayanasutra.^{♦ 1} As the story is told here (fol. 61r), the bodhisattva is well aware that killing the deceptive merchant he “will thereby burn for a hundred thousand eons in the hell of beings and experience the pains of the great hell of beings.”^{♦ 2} On the other hand, however, and in Jigten Gönpo’s understanding as a seperate unmixed result, the bodhisattva’s stay in samsara will be shortened by a hundred thousand eons through his skill in means and due to his great compassion.^{♦ 3}

The above mentioned interepretation in the Bodhisattvabhumi (which is not accepted by Jigten Gönpo) is somewhat similar to the one that can be found in the Arya Upayakaushalya Mahayanasutra,^{♦ 4} which otherwise, however, does not seem to have played an important role in the Indian or Tibetan traditions. According to this text, the bodhisattva is again aware of the fact that he will burn in hell,^{♦ 5} but a bit further down in the text, and in fact somewhat contradictory, the bodhisattva is said to have been backed up by a thousand eon’s experience in skill and compassion and that one should not think that he was obscured even by the least bit of karma. Yet the text continues to say “the Tathagata (who is the one to tell the story) [merely] revealed the workings of the beings’ karma.”^{♦ 6} It remains unclear, however, what is meant by this last remark. Does the storyteller (the former bodhisattva himself, who is now the Buddha), mean to say that the negative karmic consequences occured, but were merely put on like a “show” for didactic purposes? And if that is the case, did the bodhisattva not suffer from the karma that he accumulated, but which apparently did not obscure him (i.e. caused his bodhisattvahood to deteroriate)? The Buddhist tradition does not agree on an interpretation of these incidents. Apparently the Mahasamghika tradition favours an interpretation according to which all incidents where a skilful means to save sentient beings, whereas the Mulasarvastivadin tradition accepted the existence of bad karma for the Buddha, albeit as mere faint echos of former bad deeds (such as the piercing of the Buddha’s foot with the acacia thorn).^{♦ 7}

However that may be, Upayakaushalyasutra appears to be a ‘developed version’ where the emphasis is on the superiority of the bodhisattva’s skills. It is in any case not the version that Jigten Gönpo bases his interpretation on and the sutra as such does not seem to play any role in India and Tibet (unless perhaps indirectly if it indeed has been the version that led to the Bodhisattvabhumis’ interpretation).

To sum up Jigten Gönpo’s view at this point, a bodhisattva may engage in non-virtuous behaviour to ripen others if he is able to bear all negative consequences and when those consequences do not destroy the basis of his bodhisattvahood. As a separate and unmixed result of the compassionate motivation and of the skilful ripening of sentient beings through such deeds, the bodhisattva’s own stay in samsara will be shortened immensely and he will be able to manifest as a fully awakened Buddha much sooner.

Jigten Gönpo’s view will become even more clear when we compare the merciful captain’s act of murder with other bodhisattvas’ deeds and their consequences mentioned by Jigten Gönpo. The difference between these acts and the merciful captain’s act is that they are “virtuous in the beginning, middle, and end,” and as such they have no negative consequences at all. The rDo sher ma states: “Through a [completely] virtuous mind the three poisons are absent and that, which is motivated by that, is taught to be free from faults.” This is stated here to contrast such completely skilful acts to the killing of the deceptive merchant, for which the merciful captain had to produce a moment of hatred in order to be able to stab the victim with a knife. An example for an act that is completely “virtuous in the beginning, middle, and end” is the king Kanakavarna’s merciful act during a twelve year famine in his kingdom. The rDo sher ma says:

The king Kanakavarna (Tib. rGyal-po gSer-mdog) did not become a thief. Since that king was the lord of all beings high [and low], he appropriated all their wealth. Therefore, having gathered all the wealth, the ones who [previously] had [wealth] were without many gods [afterwards], those who [previously] were without [wealth] were not caused to die from hunger, because [the king] took care of all of them alike, and apart from doing that, he did not gather wealth desiring it for himself. Since he gathered [wealth] only for these peoples’ benefit, it was solely a virtuous motivation, unmixed with the three poisons. Thus it was a faultless skilful conduct.

And our commentary summarises:

If [the motivation] is in that way not mixed with the three poisons, it is virtuous at the beginning, in the middle, and in the end, and the benefit of oneself and others arises in great measures. Since that doesn’t become a fault, it is permitted.

The crucial point of this story is, in Jigten Gönpo’s view, that Kanakavarna only apparently committed an act of thievery, but in reality he did not: foreseeing the twelve-year famine, he acted as a skilful statesman who simply collected a kind of a tax for the benefit of the whole society and didn’t keep anything for himself. Whereas the merciful captain would have to produce hatred in order to be able to stab the victim with the knife, the king did not need to produce desire in order to be able to collect the wealth. He did this purely with a virtuous motivation in the beginning, middle, and end, and thus was without any fault. As a consequence he only experienced the shortening of his stay in samsara, but no negative consequences whatsoever.^{♦ 8} There are two other examples discussed in our commentaries: The brahmin Jyotis, who gave up celibacy for a girl that was extremely attached to him, and the Rishi Mes-byin, who did not speak the untruth, although it seemed so on the surface. Let it be only stated here that these acts where similarly virtuous in the beginning, middle, and end, and without all selfishness. They had therefore, like the king Kanakavaròa’s deed, only virtuous consequences. As such, these are the true skilful acts of bodhisattvas, because no non-virtue is committed for or results from them.

Thus when Jigten Gönpo states that “the ‘non-virtuous that does not become a fault’ is not permitted,” he means that there is no non-virtue that does not become a fault and hence such a thing (that is inexistent) can also not be permitted. There are certain bodhisattva acts that contain non-virtuous activities and are permitted, but only when they are committed in order to ripen beings and when their painful consequences can be endured by the bodhisattva without damaging the basis of his bodhisattvahood. True skilful bodhisattva acts, however, are virtuous in all respects and therefore have only virtuous results.

Notes
^{1. [Arya Sarvabuddhamaharahasyopayakausalya Jñanottarabodhisattvapariprcchaparivarta Mahayanasutra (D vol. 44, no. 82, fols. 30r1-70v7; P vol. 24, no. 760/38, fols. 4v5-50v6; H vol. 40, fols. 79r6-139v7).]↩}

^{2. [Fol. 61r: ‘di ltar bdag gis mi ‘di srog dang phral na gzhi des bdag bskal pa ‘bum du sems can dmyal ba chen po rnams su sreg par ‘gyur yang bdag gis sems can dmyal ba chen po’i sdug bsngal myong bar ‘gyur ba.]↩}

^{3. [thabs la mkhas pa de dang/ snying rje chen po des bskal pa ‘bum du ‘khor ba bsnyil te bor bar gyur to/.]↩}

^{4. [Arya Upayakaushalya Mahayanasutra (‘Phags pa thabs mkhas pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo), P vol. 36, no. 927, fols. 298v3-327r6; D vol. 66, no. 261, 283v2-310r7.]↩}

^{5. [Fol 304r: gal te bdag gis mi ‘di srog dang dbral te/ de’i phyir bdag sems can dmyal bar skyes kyang bskal pa brgya stong du phyi phyir sems can dmyal ba chen por skyes bar bzod kyi/]↩}

^{6. [Fol. 304v: rigs kyi bu ngas ni thabs mkhas pa de dang snying rje chen po des bskal pa brgya phrag stong du ‘khor ba la rgyab kyis phyogs par byas so// mi de yang shi ‘phos nas mtho ris kyi ‘jig rten du skyes so// gang tshong pa lnga brgya po grur zhugs pa de dag ni phyis bskal pa bzang po la sangs rgyas lnga brgyar ‘byung ba’o// rigs kyi bu de ji snyam du sems/ gang gis bskal pa brgya phrag stong du thabs mkhas pa’i ye shes kyis ‘khor ba la rgyab kyis phyogs pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen po de la las kyi sgrib pa cung zad kyang yod dam/ rigs kyi bu khyod de ltar ma blta shig/ de bzhin gshegs pa ni sems can gyi las kyi bya ba ston to/]↩}

^{7. [See for a detailed study Guang Xing (2005) The Concept of the Buddha: Its Evolution from early Buddhism to the trikaya theory, London: Routledge, p. 106 ff.]↩}

^{8. [See the Kanakavarnasutra, which is part of the larger Divyavadana, Wilson (1856) “On Buddha and Buddhism,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland vol. 16, pp. 229-255, p. 242.]↩}

When I started this blog a few months ago, it was never my intention to get involved in ‘politics’ through my postings. Yet the following may have a potential for such an involvement. Let me state here right at the beginning, however, that H.H. the Dalai Lama’s statements only serve here for providing the occasion to discuss some doctrinal matters in the text under research, the Drikungpa’s dGongs gcig.

Three days ago, on October 23, 2012, H.H. the Dalai Lama stated on NBC: “I am quite certain that those who sacrificed their lives with sincere motivation, for Buddha dharma and for the well-being of the people, from the Buddhist or religious view points, is positive. But if these acts are carried out with full anger and hatred, then it is wrong. So it is difficult to judge. But it is really very sad, very very sad.”^{♦ 1}

What H.H. the Dalai Lama is saying here is that, doctrinally speaking, to sacrifice one’s life “with sincere motivation, for Buddha dharma and for the well-being of the people … is positive.” Out of anger and hatred, however, it is wrong. He must have in mind the well known passage from the Abhidharmakosha, according to which (good or bad) karma is volition, i.e. a good volition leads to a positive result, whereas a bad volition must lead to a negative one.

But this is not the only doctrinal perspective.

The Dalai Lama himself is referring here to the “well-being of the people,” that is, he alludes to the mahayana doctrine of the bodhisattva who offers his body for the benefit of other beings. The well known Jataka stories of the monkey king who offers his body as a bridge to other monkeys (and dies) and the bodhisattva who offers his body as food to the starving tigress come to mind.

In the dGongs gcig the problem of offering one’s body and life is discussed in the connection of the “exchange of self and other.” An unnamed teacher is quoted with the words: “Out of compassion good aspirations are formed for the benefit of others and the suffering of others is exchanged for one’s own [happiness].” Jigten Gönpo’s remarks in this context (dGongs gcig 4.8): “There are cases where the exchange of the self and other is a fault.” When and why is that so?

First of all, in Jigten Gönpo’s view such a practise is not always a fault, but there are cases where it is a fault. He states that up to and including the level of the two bodhisattva paths of accumulation and preparation the bodhisattva carries out practical efforts for the benefit of others as much as he is able to, having first cultivated the vast power of motivation. Yet this is still the time when a practitioner must take care of himself through virtuous practise, because both the motivation and the skills of the bodhisattva are not firm enough. Once the bodhisattva has entered the path of seeing and progresses gradually up to the seventh bodhisattva level, both the motivation and the practise are increasing, until the motivation has become vastly cultivated and the practise is carried out to the greatest possible extend. This is then the time of the “equality of the self and others.” And from the eighth to the tenth bodhisattva level, both motivation and practise are of great power, the benefit of others is vastly accomplished, one is able to engage in the vast activities, the yogic discipline is very great, and one obtains also the great power for the enduring of suffering. Therefore, with combined motivation and practise of that sort it is now possible to engage in the practises of “vast liberality” (such as offering one’s life).

The reason not to engage in such practises at an earlier point of one’s bodhisattva career, says Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa, is that “if you have the wish to exchange self and other with small discriminating knowledge but great faith, it will become an obstacle, like the sickness of the lord Phagmodrupa, who suffered from constant headaches because of his former aspiration that the sufferings of others may always ripen in him. In the Bodhicaryavatara (86-87) it is said:

Do not harm for a trifle reason
the body that practises excellent Dharma!
(…)
Do not give your body
as long as your motivation of compassion remains impure!

To give you body and life prematurely is likened to the destruction of the seedling of a medical plant. If it is uprooted too early, its potential is completely lost. But, as Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa says, if one skilfully allows it to develop, when it is fully developed, the trunk, branches, leaves, petals, flowers, fruits, bark and so forth all turn into medicines that sustain immeasurable beings. Similarly, the bodhisattvas, too, must know the right occasion and must act skilfully. The illustration means according to the rDo sher ma that “if the new sprout of supreme awakening that has not [yet] become the powerful resolve for awakening turns into a deterioration of the resolve for awakening and an impediment on the path through untimely exchange of oneself and others, it is an impediment for the medicine that removes all samsaric suffering through supreme awakening, for the [wish fulfilling] tree that annihilates all poverty, and for the [precious jewel that is the] source of all that is necessary and desired, and therefore it is taught that one has to guard against untimely practises.” If the beginning bodhisattva loses the path due to the pain that he experiences through the offering in this life and because his rebirth is not one where the bodhisattva path can be practised, he destroys through his one compassionate deed his whole potential: He acts with great faith but little discriminating knowledge.

Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa provides a story that is a drastic illustration of this point. Earlier, he says, Arya Shariputra cultivated the resolve for supreme awakening and while he was practising the conduct of bodhisattvas for many eons, at one occasion one person said: “Give one of your eyes to me!” Thus he took out one of his eyes and gave it to that person. Then that person placed one foot on top of it and squashed it. [Shariputra said]: “Why did you do that?” [The person replied]: “I wanted it to make the sound ‘squash.’” Shariputra became very downcast and thinking that there was nothing he could do for these beings, he grew frustrated. When this petty thought arose, he became a shravaka [again].

The rDo sher ma mentions that Shariputra was on the sixth bodhisattva level at that time. The text states that even up to the seventh level one is not able at all to bear that kind of suffering and that therefore the exchange of self and others will be a fault. It furthermore states: “If someone who has not obtained the tolerance [i.e. the ability to bear the sufferings] wishes to perform the benefit of others, he needs to investigate whether he should form that aspiration or not by way of five reasons. (1) Is something like that the intention of the excellent guru [referring here to Phagmodrupa] or not? (2) Does that dedication match the resolve or not? (3) Is the aspiration, when one forms it, achieved or not? (4) If it is achieved, can one bear it or not? (5) Apart from that, are there other means or not?” The text explains these five points as follows. (1) It is not the heart intention of Phagmodrupa, since he himself experienced problems from premature aspirations (as mentioned above). (2) If one is overpowered by the accumulations of sufferings and faults and the former aspiration thus turns into the “impediment of goodness,” the dedication does not match the resolve “[may it] cause the obtainment of Buddhahood for myself and all others.” (3) Since the Mañjushribuddhakshetragunavyuha Mahayanasutra (Derge, vol. 41, passage not identified) says:

All phenomena depend entirely
on the goal of one’s striving as [their] condition;
whichever aspiration one forms,
a result like that will be obtained—

the aspiration will always be accomplished. (4) Even up to the seventh level one is not able at all to bear the suffering of others. Therefore the exchange of self and others will be a fault. (5) If one possesses great discriminating knowledge, other means exist. According to the Rin byang ma: “We [in our tradition] engage in these aspirations and practises having familiarised to the ‘taking as path’ and to the precious resolve for awakening, when we have obtained the great compassion of the ultimate level that cannot deteriorate through unfavourable conditions and when we have realised the sameness of all phenomena at the time of being someone like the lord Avalokiteshvara and Mañjushrikumara.” Both the rDo sher ma and the Rin byang ma state also a story where a girl is born in hell with a burning iron wheel on her head and 166,000 years ahead to bear that pain. Experiencing that pain she spontaneously formed the aspiration that others with the same karma should not have to experience this pain through her own taking of that pain upon herself. That is to say: she knew well what she was doing and her act was a spontaneous act of compassion. As a consequence of that wish the wheel rose up and she was freed from that suffering and reborn in Tushita.^{♦ 2}

Returning now to the discussion of self-immolation in present day Tibet and China, I too feel very sad about the loss of so many lives. There is certainly a heroic aspect in giving one’s life for one’s people. And since this causes so many deep emotions among the Tibetans, I can understand that the Dalai Lama doesn’t really have a chance to criticise these deeds. But on the background of the above doctrinal discussion in the commentaries of the dGongs gcig I wonder whether the reference to good volitions leading to good results fully exhausts the full range of doctrinal issues regarding the offering of one’s own life.

I wish the Tibetans could find other means of protest than destroying their own lives, and I can only hope that those who do it nonetheless are not doing it simply out of sheer desperation.

Notes

^{1. [http://tibet.net/2012/10/23/nbc-interviews-his-holiness-the-dalai-lama-on-self-immolation-tragedy-in-tibet/]↩}

^{2. [For the story of Maitranyaka, see John Brough (1957) “Some Notes on Maitrakanyaka: Divyavadana XXXVIII,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 20, No. 1/3, Studies in Honour of Sir Ralph Turner, Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 1937-57, pp. 111-132.]↩}

In my last post I wrote about ‘ignorance,’ or rather, as we’ve learned from Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa, ‘cognitive misorientation.’ Immediately afterwards I received a mail from a reader, asking: “But what about omniscience?” That is one of those questions where you better stop yourself before you come up with some quick Wikipedia-type answer. What about omniscience? A good question.

‘Omniscience’ (Skt. saravajña) is one of those terms with an enormous history and therefore, necessarily, with many developments.^{♦ 1} In the Vedas omniscience was an attribute of gods only, namely the power of “knowing all created beings.” Later, in the Upanishads, we find for the first time the proper term sarvajña, meaning here “knowledge of atman/soul,” which was thought to be an attribute of a spiritually developed human being.

The questions that naturally arise when we (and evidently also people in ancient times) come across the concept of omniscience are: Is it a mere potential for knowing everything, or is it an accomplished fact? Is it perhaps only a metaphor? What does it take to be omniscient? Does it mean ‘to know everything,’ or ‘to know what all things have in common, such as their nature (or the nature of things in general)’?

If we look into the sutras of early Buddhism, as so often, the Buddha replied to questions about omniscience strictly on a “need to know” basis. In the Tevijja-Vacchagotta Sutta (MN i 481), the wanderer Vacchagotta meets the Buddha and asks him: Are you omniscient like the Jaina? The Buddha replies (among other things) that he has three knowledges: He can recall his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has the knowledge that he became liberated by destroying the cankers (sense-desires, desiring existence, grasping views and, conditioning the others, cognitive misorientation, MN i 54-55). Of particular importance is the knowledge that he became liberated by destroying the cankers. This includes his understanding of how liberation is obtained. He does not speak here of a literal kind of omniscience, i.e. of a knowledge of every single object that can be known.

On another occasion the Buddha said: “It is not possible that a brahman or contemplative could know everything and see everything all at once.” (Kannakatthala Sutta, MN ii 125).^{♦ 2} And similarly, being asked about it, Nagasena says to king Milinda (Miln 102-107): “The Lord was omniscient, but knowledge-and-vision was not constantly and continuously present to the Lord. The Lord’s omniscient knowledge was dependent on the adverting (of his mind [i.e. where he turned his mind to]); when he adverted it he knew whatever it pleased (him to know)” (Naughton, p. 35). According to these two texts there was potentially more knowledge, and more of a ‘knowing everything’ type of knowledge, but such knowledge depended on the Buddhas conscious decision to focus on it; it was not a continuous and simultaneous presence in his mind. In still other words, omniscience is here a potential for knowing any particular thing, which can be actualised at any time by will. But it has to be actualised, because outside of that actualisation, he is not omniscient all the time.

The development in the mahayana literature is as diverse as the texts occurring starting from the first century: the Prajñaparamita Sutras and other mahayana sutras, the Abhidharmakosha, the Five Works of Maitreyanatha / Asanga, the logicians’ treatises, and many more. In them we find all of the above mentioned points, including at a late time (8th c.) a literal omniscience, but mostly a tendency to emphasize the Buddha’s perfection of knowledge relevant to methods of liberation.

How does the 17th century commentator of the dGongs gcig, Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa, deal with these multiple concepts of omniscience? Note, by the way, that he is, like several other great Tibetan masters from all lineages, called an “Omniscient One” (Tib. kun mkhyen pa).^{♦ 3}

Knowing all …
In the context of discussing the three baskets and the four tantra classes as stages of the path (dGongs gcig 1.3) Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa quotes the Mahayanasutralamkara (11.2):

Sutra, abhidharma and vinaya
are, in short, held to be four topics [each].^{♦ 4}
The intelligent ones understand these
and obtain omniscience.

Thus an Omniscient One is a person who has mastered all the teachings of the three baskets. And while in the above quote omniscience is limited to the knowledge of the Buddha’s teachings, in another context, namely the discussion of ‘valid knowledge’ (Skt. pramana, Tib. tshad ma), it also is explicitly said to contain completely all valid knowledge:

‘Valid knowledge’ means ‘not deceiving’ and ‘true meaning,’ and that is precisely the sphere of omniscience.

This is a point in the dGongs gcig (1.16) with interesting consequences. While some Tibetan scholars held that ‘valid knowledge’ is an occasion of mere dialectic conceptualization (and thus not directly relevant for liberation),^{♦ 5} Jigten Gönpo, however, maintained that “valid knowledge is the gnosis that is the knowledge of the Buddha.” Not only is the Buddha himself praised as the “embodiment of valid knowledge” in the opening line of Dignaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, but it can also be shown by reasoning that valid knowledge “is precisely showing just the way how something is by nature … [and] … is both from the perspective of the example and the meaning certainly precisely the gnosis of the knowledge of the Buddha,” because “ultimately [y] does not follow [from x just] because [someone is] seeing [it that way], while [in reality y] would not exist in the nature [of x].”^{♦ 6} One further consequence of this view is, by the way, that anyone, including non-Buddhists, who utters valid knowledge is in accordance with the gnosis of the knowledge of the Buddha—an interesting case of trans-Buddhist non-sectarianism.

Disciplined conduct (shila)
In the dGongs gcig’s chapter on Vinaya/Pratimoksha, Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa quotes from a commentary composed by Acarya Jinamitra (the Pratimokshasutratika Vinayasamuccaya) where it is said:

With regard to [the term] ‘pratimoksha,’ it is called so since liberation and omniscience are actualised by practising the training of giving up (wrong conduct) and implementing (right conduct) without confusing [these two].^{♦ 7}
And according to Jigten Gönpo it is not only so that both liberation and omniscience can only be achieved based on disciplined conduct, but actually “the precious disciplined conduct is the gnosis of omniscience” (dGongs gcig 3.3). This is to say that the whole of the vinaya itself is within the sphere of omniscience alone, or, in other words, that no one except the omniscient Tathagata is able to establish the basic training of the Vinaya-Dharma, not even a tenth-stage bodhisattva. The reason for that is that only the Omniscient One completely understands the reality of dependent origination, of karma, and of “what is possible and what is impossible.”^{♦ 8} In Jigten Gönpo’s understanding, all the rules established by the Buddha in the vinaya-pratimoksha are rules that accord to the nature of reality. None of them is a rule based on the Buddha’s own ideas. Thus, in contrast to other teachers, Jigten Gönpo does not accept the distinction introduced by some commentators according to which there are ‘natural rules’ (kha na ma tho ba) that apply to everyone (such as ‘not killing’) and ‘made rules’ (bcas pa) that are only for the monks and nuns (such as ‘not eating after noon’). This interesting aspect of Jigten Gönpo’s teachings (with far reaching consequences for the understanding of ‘ethics’) will have to be discussed in a posting specifically concerned with this particular problem alone.

Knowing the essence
In another section of his commentary, Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa quotes Maitreyanatha (Uttaratantrashastra 5.20):^{♦ 9}

A scholar who is greater than the Victorious One does not exist in this world.
The Omniscient One knows perfectly the supreme true reality of everything, others not.

Here ‘omniscience’ is obviously understood as knowing the essential true reality of every single phenomenon, but with an emphasis on the fact that the ‘essence’ is being one and the same for all things. This theme, the one essence that can be found in everything, is with variations a topic of many mahayana scriptures. Conceptually, it is often combined with the idea that all teachings, too, have a single essence. In his introduction to the dGongs gcig (the Khog dbub), the 13th century commentator Dorje Sherab presents several quotations supporting the idea of a nucleus of the Dharma and of an underlying essence of all phenomena. He quotes for instance the Samadhirajasutra with these words:^{♦ 10}

Whichever sutra I have taught
in a thousand world realms
has different words, [yet only] a single meaning.

And in the same sutra:^{♦ 11}

I have taught all Dharmas as a single meaning.

This single meaning is taught in the dGongs gcig to be mahamudra, where ‘mahamudra’ is synonymous with ‘non-arising’ (phyag rgya chen po skye ba med pa). When one has understood that single thing, says Dorje Sherab, one has removed all the particulars of the classifications (dbye bsdu’i bye brag) with regard to all phenomena of samsara and nirvana (and that is where the two themes of ‘single essence of the teachings’ and ‘same essence of all phenomena’ coincide). A similar quote is attributed to the Prajñaparamitasutra:^{♦ 12}

If one knows the true reality (de bzhin nyid) of any single one of whichever phenomena that can be known, such as ‘form,’ one understands in brief and in detail all phenomena.

And Atisha, too, said:^{♦ 13}

Whichever of the 84.000
Dharma gates was taught—
it all boils down to this true reality.

In which way is this realisation of the true reality, the single essence of all phenomena, omniscience? To explain this point, Milarepa is quoted with a well-known line:^{♦ 14}

Knowing one thing I am a master of all. Knowing all I understand it as one.

Combining the statements of the Prajñaparamitasutra and of Milarepa, Dorje Sherab summarises:

If one understands that meaning, one is able to differentiate the one single [thing] into many and to combine the many into one.

Thus it is precisely the understanding of the true reality of any single thing that enables the Buddha to unfold that essential true reality into the diversity of his teachings in a meaningful way. The variety in his teaching is of course necessary due to the different appetites of the beings to be trained: the Buddha, it is often said, understanding the various capacity of beings, taught 84.000 Dharmas. It is, however, essential that each of these Dharmas is not divorced from the essential nature: No matter how many Dharmas are taught by the Buddha, “since in the end there is nothing that is not included within uniform non-arising—the meaning of mahamudra and ocean of true reality (dharmata)—[they all have] a ‘single intention.’”^{♦ 15} Which also serves as a nice explanation of the title of the work dGongs gcig, which can be read as Single Intention.

Knowing liberation’s methods
Another important aspect of omniscience that was, as we have seen, already found in earliest Buddhism is the Omniscient One’s knowledge of how he himself has become liberated and consequently of how others are to be liberated skilfully. With this regard Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa cites the Extensive Prajñaparamitasutra (unidentified passage):

A bodhisattva must understand all causes, paths, and results of all of samsara and nirvana from the hell of beings up to omniscience.

Similarly we find many passages throughout the commentary stressing that it is only the Omniscient One who has the perfection of that knowledge and who knows perfectly how to establish the individual marks of a Buddha through all the individual causes, and it is only the Buddha who knows the thoughts, constitution, abilities, and latencies of the trainees perfectly. Therefore he alone is able to skilfully reveal the activities in perfect match with the constitutions of the sentient beings.

Individually and essentially
Yet apart from all these understandings of omniscience of ‘knowing all’ in the sense of ‘knowing all teachings,’ ‘possessing (or embodying) valid knowledge,’ ‘knowing the essence’ and so forth, there is also the aspect of omniscience that knows every single thing individually, as expressed in the Uttaratantrashastra 1.16:^{♦ 16}

… [their] understanding, which has realised all knowledge objects [as well as their] ultimate [state],
perceives that the true reality of omniscience
exists in all sentient beings (…)

This refers to the ‘two kinds of knowledge’ (Tib. mkhyen pa gnyis), namely the Buddha’s knowledge of ‘how things are’ (ci lta ba) and the knowledge of ‘the various cases’ (ji snyed pa). This is defined in the context of dGongs gcig 3.3. as the ‘realisation of the nature of samsara and nirvana’ (= how they are in their essence) and as ‘knowing all the dependent originations of cause and result in that state individually and in an unmixed way’ (= in the various individual cases). Of these the first is an understanding of the underlying nature of everything as it has been discussed above, and here in particular it is explained as the realisation that right from the beginning the defilements never existed (which is the final one of the ten powers of the Tathagata). The second knowledge is one of all objects individually, in the sense that each specific dependent origination of cause and result of every individual thing is known, and this includes according to Dorje Sherab’s commentary the other nine powers, which are pertaining to such things as knowing what is wholesome and what not, the ripening of karma, the dispositions, abilities, and inclination of beings, their past and future births and so forth. Thus even though it is by name a knowledge of every single thing, the emphasis is clearly on all those things that are necessary to know for an expert guide of beings to liberation. Furthermore since it is stated here that the individual knowledge is one that knows ‘in that state,’ namely in the state of understanding the essence, the individual qualities are known understanding first the nature of everything, as it was said by Milarepa: “Knowing one thing I am a master of all.”

This may also be part of the answer to the question: does the Buddha know everything simultaneously? I think one can draw the conclusion from all that is said above that in this system he is believed to know the underlying true reality of all things at all times, but the individual ‘dependent originations’ etc. are only relevant when it comes to the taming of beings.

Interestingly, this point seems to be brought up again in dGongs gcig 7.5, which is in Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa’s commentary among other things a discussion of the Buddha’s relation to the individual beings-to-be-tamed. Here the question is asked that if the Buddha “never deviates from his meditative balance and mental constructions do not overpower him,” is such a “sphere of omniscience not incompatible with the teacher who tames whoever needs taming?” As a reply the commentator quotes Maitreyanatha’s Mahayanottaratantrashastra again:^{♦ 17}

Immeasurable reflections of Sugata-suns
appear simultaneously
on the [surface of] all water receptacles
that are all the pure disciples.

In other words, the individualisation takes place simultaneously in the receptacles, i.e. the minds of the pure disciples. But to draw the conclusion from this that there is no individual knowledge in the omniscient state would probably be an over-interpretation. But it seems clear that such individuation depends on the causes and conditions of the Buddha coming into contact with the trainees.

Notes

^{1. [A good brief overview of the concept in the Vedas, and later of the term itself in the Upanišads and in early Buddhism, is provided by Alex Naughton (1991) “Buddhist omniscience,” Eastern Buddhist 24/1, 28-51, for the early history see especially pp. 28-37. The remaining part of the article I see with more sceptical eyes, because it is based on the assumptions that (a) ‘earlier’ must be ‘more original’ (and thus, also within early Buddhism, what feels to him ‘more original’ must also be earlier), and (b) that authors or teachers would never write or teach at one time this and at another time something which (in Naughton’s eyes) does not seem to fit to that. I think that both of these concepts, in their rigid form, have become outdated and that they arose from a philological fixation on ‘the text’ alone, neglecting biographical, didactical and other perspectives. There is an interesting critique of these and related concepts in Christian Wedemeyer’s forthcoming bookMaking Sense of Tantric Buddhism: History, Semiology, and Transgression in the Indian Traditions (Columbia University Press).]↩}

^{2. [Translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, see the web-page Access to Insight.]↩}

^{3. [A brief sample of well-known Omniscient Ones in Tibetan Buddhism is the following:
– among the Jo-nang-pas Dol-po-pa (1292-1361)
– among the rNying-ma-pas Long-chen Rab-‘byams-pa (1308-1364)
– among the Sa-skya-pas Go-rams-pa (1429-1489)
– among the ‘Brug-pa bKa’-brgyud-pas Pad-ma-dkar-po (1527-1592)
– and among the dGe-lugs-pas ‘Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa (1648-1722).]↩}

^{4. [Each of the three, i.e. sutra, abhidharma and vinaya, are explained in Mahayanasutralamkara (11.2) to have four topics. Sutra, for instance, has the topics (1) ‘context’ (of the discourse), (2) ‘nature’ (i.e. relative and absolute truths), (3) ‘teaching’ (i.e. contents of the discourse), and (4) ‘meaning’ (i.e. its implication). See Jamspal et al., The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (2004: 113-115).]↩}

^{5. [Leonard van der Kuijp (Journal of Indian Philosophy 15, 57-70) has dealt with this and the next vajra statement at some length. He points out that the opponents were in this case identified to be Ngog Lotsava Loden Sherab (1059-1109) and Jayananda. They are criticised in the dGongs gcig because they maintain only a “provisional” function of valid knowledge, which means that according to them it has no soteriological range and that madhyamaka analysis is superior. This was also claimed by the Kadampas of this period (and later by Sakya Pandita), who held that valid knowledge had only a kind of secondary function in that it provided tools for the elimination of misconceptions and doubts concerning the doctrine. As such, they explain, it was also used by non-Buddhist philosophical schools in India.]↩}

^{6. [These lines are from Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa’s commentary. According to van der Kuijp, Tsongkapa might have been inspired in his views by Jigten Gonpo.]↩}

^{7. [I was unable to verify this citation; it is said to be from the fiftieth section of the commentary. The term pratimoksha is here explained through a didactic etymology (at least regarding prati). The first element, prati (Tib. so sor) is explained as ‘without confusing them for another’ (so sor ma ‘dres par); the second, moksha (Tib. thar pa) is as usual ‘liberation.’]↩}

^{8. [Skt. sthanasthanajñanabalam. This wisdom is the first of the “ten powers of the Tathagata” (dashatathagatabalani). This power is in general explained as the knowledge that karma and defilement are the cause of the birth of beings, and that a self and a creator (ishvara) are not that cause, and that it is possible that higher spheres arise through the wholesome, but impossible that lower spheres arise through it, etc. Cf. Ratnagotravibhaga, ch. XV, v. 2-5; Abhidharmakoshabhashya, Pradhan (1967: 411, 133; 414, 3).]↩}

^{9. [Mahayanottaratantrashastra, D vol. 123, this passage is on 72v, 5-6. In Takasaki’s translation (1966) see pp. 386, 394, and in Fuchs’s translation (2000) p. 292.]↩}

^{10. [Samadhirajasutra (D vol. 55, fol. 104v): ‘jig rten khams ni stong dag tu// ngas ni mdo sde gang bshad pa// tshig ‘bru tha dad don gcig ste//.]↩}

^{11. [Khog dbub (p. 225 f.): chos kun don gcig par ni rab bshad do//. Variant in D vol. 55, fol. 43v: rab shes do//.]↩}

^{12. [Khog dbub p. 226: gzugs nas rnam mkhyen gyi chos gang yang rung ba gcig gi de bzhin nyid shes na chos thams cad kyi mdo dang rgyas pa shes par ‘gyur ro//. This is an abbreviation of passages that enumerate dharmas, whose true reality is known in this way, starting with gzugs and ending with rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid. See in D vol. 28, no. 9 (fol. 112v) and vol. 30, no. 10 (fol. 300r f.).]↩}

^{13. [bDen pa gnyis la ‘jug pa (Satyadvayavatara), P vol. ha (110), no. 5298, fols. 70r5-71v2, D vol. A (109), no. 3902, fols.72r3-73r7 (72v, line 4): chos kyi phung po brgyad khri dang // gzhi stong gsungs pa gang yin pa// chos nyid ‘di la gzhol zhing ‘bab//.]↩}

^{14. [Khog dbub p. 226, and Rupa’i Gyan-chen (gTsang-smyon Heruka Rus-pa’i-rgyan-can), Complete Biography of Milarepa, Varanasi 1971, p. 204.): nga gcig shes kun la mkhas pa yin// kun shes gcig tu go ba yin//.]↩}

^{15. [Khog dbub 226: thams cad mthar thug tshul gcig pa’i skye med phyag rgya chen po’i don chos nyid kyi rgya mtsho chen por mi ‘du ba med pas des na dgongs pa gcig pa zhes bya ste.]↩}

^{16. [D vol. 123, fol. 55v. See Takasaki (1966: 175); Fuchs (2000: 110).]↩}

^{17. [Mahayanottaratantrashastra, D vol. 123, fol. 70r.]↩}

Rig-‘dzin Chos-kyi-grags-pa says in his commentary on dGongs gcig 2.5: “We do not maintain that this cognitive misorientation is like fainting to unconsciousness or like a ‘not seeing with one’s eyes,’ but that cognitive misorientation is a grasping of the marks of delusion that obscure true reality (de kho na nyid kyi don la bsgribs pa), i.e. just that which is the root of the five poisons.”

Note that this is his definition of (Skt.) avidya (Tib. ma rig pa), which is often translated as ‘ignorance’, in the sense of “lack of knowledge or information” and the like. But as the commentator points out, it is not to be understood as a simple passive ‘not-knowing’ of something, i.e. as a blank spot in one’s knowledge. It is rather an active mistake-making in the sense of a mis-performance of one’s cognition, as it is a “grasping of the marks of delusion that obscure true reality.”

This understanding has consequences for how avidya can be removed. As the true knowledge is already present as ‘true reality’ (tathata, Tib. de kho na nyid), but is obscured by “the grasping of the marks of delusion,” it is that grasping that has to be removed, and that cannot be achieved merely by intellectual knowledge.

Already in the Analysis of the Dependent Origination-Sutta (Samyutta Nikaya ii 4) of early Buddhism, avidya is defined as not knowing suffering, its origination, its cessation, and the way that leads to its cessation. At least in the first instance—not knowing suffering—too, it is not a simple lack of information, but a misconstruction of suffering and pain, which is all-pervading, as pleasure and so forth, such as the belief that the fulfilment of desire leads to happiness. And avidya, it is noted, can also not simply be replaced by knowledge in any ordinary sense, but has to be removed by a combination of calm abiding (shamatha) and superior insight (vipashyana) (Anguttara Nikaya i 61).

Already Jäschke noted in his famous dictionary (1881) about ma rig pa: “… mostly used in the specific Buddhist sense, viz. for the innate principle and fundamental error of considering perishable things as permanent and of looking upon the external world as one really existing (…).”

Sarat Chandra Das, on the other hand, who otherwise copied freely from Jäschke, embezzles this important remark and explains ma rig pa as ‘ignorance’ in the sense of “not knowing the things and phenomena of the three worlds.”

In sum, it seems, it would be better to understand avidya not as ignorance (Lat. ignorare = not knowing), but rather as ‘mis-knowledge,’ in the sense of a cognitive misorientation, i.e. a grasping of error.

One of the most widespread truisms concerning mantra is that it “takes the result as the path.” Applied to the practise of the deity of mantra this means that the psychological and physical constituents of the person are, when practised in the form of self-cultivation as the deity of mantra, the result, namely the Buddha. In other words one’s body—although one hasn’t realised that yet—is primordially established as the nature of the deity, and that body is therefore actually not different from the essence of the deity at the time of the result, namely buddhahood. For that reason, when the “result is taken as the path,” all the aspects of the deity, such as its face and hands, are taken as the path.

Moreover, various tantras such as that of Cakrasamvara and Guhyasamaja teach that the body is actually a multitude of deities, with each channel, constituent, and element being a male or female Buddha, as said in the Guhyasamajatantra:^{♦ 1}

In short, the five skandhas are the Buddhas,
[i.e.] all the Tathagatas,
the vajra-ayatanas, too,
are the supreme mandala of bodhisattvas,
the [element of] earth is Locana,
the element of water is Mamaki,
and Pandura and Tara
are well known as [the elements of] fire and wind.

And the Samputitantra teaches that even the gestation process of the human body of ten (lunar) months equals the path of the ten bodhisattva levels (Skr. bhumi).^{♦ 2} Therefore to cultivate one’s own body as a deity of mantra is not like producing an artificial mandala painting or statue of a deity. Instead, Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa says, this cultivation is “taking that which exists in the ground as the path” (gzhi la yod pa lam du byas pa). The body, in its nature, already is the Buddha. And Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa continues to explain that such a cultivation is not a practise where one would search for something (i.e. buddhahood) that doesn’t exist from the very beginning in the ground, and where one would obtain a result that is somehow separated from the ground. “If you think,” he says “that you are practising something that is not in your own [nature] (rang la med pa zhig bsgom), you would experience the transgression of the eight and ninth pledge [of mantra],” since disregarding one’s own body by not seeing it as being the Buddha you would view the skandhas as ordinary and you would dismiss as “bad” what actually is pure by nature.

These points are made in Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpas commentary on dGongs gcig 5.5: “The stage of production (bskyed rim) is thoroughly established.” Other interesting remarks are found in his commentary on dGongs gcig 5.10: “All elaborations arise through the dependent origination of the nature.”

Here one of the principle points is that neither the deity itself, nor the mandala wheel that is cultivated together with it, are to be regarded as an artificial creation (bcos pa), which is, obviously, closely related to dGongs gcig 5.5 above. Rather than being an artificial creation, the deity and the mandala are understood to originate in dependence on the natural state (gshis babs kyi rten ‘brel las ‘byung ba), i.e. they are elaborations (spros pa) depending on the original nature. What is meant here by “elaborations”? Dorje Sherab provides in his commentary the examples of “seed, letter, seat, posture, shape, colour, ornaments” etc. (of the deity), and he explains that some people hold the opinion that these elaborations are for individuals who enjoy very elaborated rituals, whereas individual of highest capacity have not much use for such rituals, because these elaborations would be only “of provisional meaning” (drang don). In contrast to this general opinion, Jigten Gonpo teaches that the stages of the elaborations (spros pa’i rim pa) exist primordially within the original nature of knowledge objects (shes bya’i gshis sam babs la). The elaborated rituals of the deities of mantra are putting that existence of the elaborations in the nature into practise and thereby accomplish the result. As the four great elements of wind, fire, water, and earth gradually come into existence through the natural state, similarly this sequence is practised in the ritual, where out of emptiness arises the syllable E, which turns into a dharmodaya—the source of phenomena—from which arise the mandalas of wind, fire, water, earth, mount meru etc., together with their respective syllables, shapes, and colours, and so forth. In that way the ritual is a practise where the mandala and the deities are gradually cultivated, arising from the original state.

In terms of purification, Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa explains that the ground that is to be purified (sbyang gzhi) from defilement is the natural state of the (yet unrealised) vajra body (rdo rje’i lus kyi gshis babs), and the means of purification (sbyong byed) that is applied to the ground, the stages of cultivation and completion (bskyed rdzogs kyi rim pa), is the natural state (gshis babs) of deity and mandala. Through the dependent origination of the practise (bsgom pa’i rten ‘brel gyis) the result is obtained, yet that result is nothing but the actualisation of the original state of that ground (gzhi de’i gshis babs mngon du byas pa yin). And Dorje Sherab remarks here that since the result is such that “the unlimited wheel of inexhaustible ornaments of body, speech, and mind of the Buddha arises, which is inseparable from emptiness and elaboration,” namely the Buddha activity that continues to exist until all beings are liberated from samsara, in particular those disciples of highest capacity must definitively practise the elaborations, because these are the causes from which those qualities and activities arise. (This topic is also taught separately in dGongs gcig 5.9: “All the detailed rituals are especially necessary for those of highest faculties.”)

But what, then, is preventing us from seeing the nature directly? What or how are those stains that have to be removed on the path from the ground in this process of purification? The stains are, as a matter of fact, nothing but adventitious defilements (as clearly expressed in Hevajratantra II.iv, 70–71)—and being “adventitious” means that any defilement of the ground is neither intrinsic to the ground nor to the means of purification, and whichever stain exists is also only temporarily existing. If the stains weren’t like that, that is, if the stains would be intrinsic to the ground or the means, and if they would not be only temporarily existing, the ground could never be purified and the means of deity practise would be useless for purification, because they would be defiled by nature. One would indeed have to search for the Buddha somewhere else.

Seen from the outside someone might describe the deities of mantra as artificial or cultural expressions of Indian civilization. But that is not how Jigten Gonpo views the matter. He teaches here that the deity of mantra is an expression or a manifestation of the original nature, through the process of dependent origination. But is the deity of mantra perhaps also dependant on the practitioner, with some practitioners perceiving it like this and others like that? Here Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa indeed says that the teaching of a deity of mantra “[has] in mind the natural state of the trainees’ constitution (gdul bya’i khams kyi gshis babs la dgongs ),” that is, the elaborations of the nature, which may be few or many in a given deity, appear in accordance to the specific constitution of the trainee. That, however, does not mean that any deity in a dream or perceived in a vision has that quality, unless the appearing deity is one that is taught by the Buddha in sutra or tantra. Therefore Jigten Gonpo said in this context (dGongs gcig 5 .8): “One must take the deities as the principle ones that are taught in sutra and tantra.” The most important reason for that is, as Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa says, that “the Omniscient One [alone] knows the pure natural state of all deities as it is and in its various cases.”

Therefore, according to these teachings of the dGongs gcig, only the deities revealed by the Buddha in sutra and tantra are the perfect elaborations of the natural state, and only they accord in their dependent origination to the natural state of the trainee’s constitution. Thus, although the trainees may perceive a deity like this or like that, it is only the Omniscient One who understands the deity’s and the trainee’s natural state and who has mastered dependent origination, and therefore only he can teach a Dharma of mantra deities that is actually and truly liberating from samsara.

Notes

^{1. [Sarvatathagatakayavakcittarahasya Guhyasamajanama Mahakalparaja, D vol. 81, fol. 142v (with minor variants).]↩}

^{2. [Samputitantra, D vol. 79, fol. 116r (with minor variants); and Kye’i rdo rje mkha’ ‘gro ma dra ba’i sdom pa’i rgyud kyi rgyal po, D vol. 80, no. 418, fol. 21v (with minor variants).]↩}

I have mentioned in my last post that the two most ancient and most important available commentaries by Dorje Sherab and Rinchen Jangchub have a different internal structure and that the different vajra statements that they chose as their starting point tell much about the commentaries’ natures. Dorje Sherab chose for his beginning the statement that “all the teachings of the Buddha are the revealing of the ultimate true nature” (see the posting “dGongs gcig 1.1”). Now it is time to turn to the first vajra statement of Rinchen Jangchub:

“This teaching that is transmitted through a lineage is profound and marvellous.”

As in all vajra statements, here too it is helpful to know its background. In this case the statement seems to have a specific view in mind, namely the idea held by some people that they possess a teaching that they realised in themselves, not depending on the guru’s oral instructions, teachings, which they felt were ‘poured out’ over them, or that were hidden in the earth before they emerged, or in cracks of trees, or that rained down on them from the sky. The particular idea that these people hold is that these Dharmas are “marvellous profound teachings that others don’t have” and that they contain the supreme intention of Dharma. This last point implicitly means that those people hold the view that such teachings are better than other teachings of the Buddha, because they do not come down through a long lineage of masters, i.e. they claim that their “short” lineages have more authenticity or blessing power than the “long” lineages. And that again implies that teachings with long lineages lose their authenticity and blessing power over time.

Here the intention of Jigten Gonpo is that the ‘edge’ (Tib. zur) of the words that transmit the meaning is not lost through a ‘mouth-to-mouth’ lineage from the perfect Buddha down to one’s root guru, and the meaning transmitted through an ‘ear-to-ear’ lineage does not turn into a fabrication or into merely nice words, and the transmission of blessing through a ‘mind-to-mind’ lineage is not interrupted just because the lineage is long. In fact, just those Dharmas that are transmitted through an unbroken lineage of realised masters with intact pledges (Skr. samaya) and blessing are profound and marvellous. Rinchen Jangchub provides four reasons why a Dharma must be transmitted through such a lineage.

(1) When the Buddha found unsurpassable awakening, he was requested by the evil Mara to enter nirvana, whereupon he replied: “I will not pass into nirvana until I have not taught the Dharma to those who are worthy vessels of the Dharma.” And that is the first reason why it is necessary to transmit the teachings through a lineage of worthy vessels: The Buddha himself made it a priority.

(2) In all mantra teachings and in particular in the supreme yoga tantra the wording of the text is intentionally twisted and the vital instructions are hidden. Yet people enter into such Dharmas just as they like, and having thus entered these Dharmas as they like without relying on a guru, they grasp a Self and grow attached to it and they hold on to this delusion by thinking “this Dharma is mine.” Since these teachings they hold on to are nothing but self-fabricated concepts, because they have not been transmitted by an authentic master, such people do not pass beyond samsara, because through self-grasping and delusion samsara is not abandoned. That is the second profound reason why the teachings need to be transmitted through a lineage of authentic masters: an inauthentic approach produces only further concepts.

(3) The mantra Dharmas are practised to obtain ordinary and supreme accomplishments, but obtaining these depends solely on the guru. That is so because the enormous amount of spiritual merit that must be accumulated to reach accomplishment can only be gathered by following the instructions of a guru who is endowed with the special characteristics. The characteristic that makes a guru authentic is that he or she has obtained realisation having received the transmission of words, meaning, pledges, and blessing through an unbroken lineage of masters. If the accumulations are not gathered by following such a guru, one’s unmeritorious karma is not overcome. If one does not overcome that karma, the inborn wisdom that is free from all proliferation of conceptual thinking cannot be actualised. If, on the other hand, one follows the instructions of such a guru, all this is reversed: one overcomes unmeritorious karma and inborn wisdom will arise.

(4) The gurus of the transmission lineage have not only realised the Dharma, but they have also removed obstacles when faults and mistakes arose, and with regard to the qualities that arose, they enhanced the realisation. When one studies the biographies of the great gurus of the various transmission lineages, one often learns that their path was full of obstacles. In fact, it seems as if the obstacles become ever more powerful the closer the practitioner gets to the highest fruition. Well known are the examples of the Buddha himself, who had to overcome the hordes of Maras just before he fully awakened, and of Jigten Gonpo, whose greatest obstacle before awakening came in the form of a naga with its retinue residing in his body, causing leprosy. In general, it is said that the mantra path is full of obstacles and false realisations. Look at the encounter between Gampopa and Milarepa! Gampopa used to say that if Milarepa would not have shaken his believe in his own previous achievements and led him on the path through many obstacles, he would have been born for millions of life-times in the realms of the gods, where he would have wasted all his wholesome accumulations. To counteract all those obstacles and false realisations, the former masters have developed methods to remove obstacles (Tib. gegs sel) and to enhance the realisation (Tib bogs ‘don). And that is the fourth reason why the Dharma that is transmitted through a lineage is profound and marvellous: expert removing of obstacles and enhancement of realisation come as a free gift.

Having given these four reasons, Rinchen Jangchub also quotes a doubt. Somebody says: “But does it not happen that through practise experience and actualisation arise without a lineage?” And Rinchen Jangchub replies: It does happen that an experience not held by one’s guru arises in the mental continuum, but such experience does not have the benefits described above and it is unreliable and perishes fast—it is merely like the joy of a full stomach.

At this point it is perhaps also necessary to discuss a misunderstanding concerning this vajra utterance. Sometimes people believe that Jigten Gonpo here makes a statement against the treasure teachings (gter ma), where the lineages are short because several centuries can be bridged over by concealing teachings that much later are rediscovered by a guru, or ‘treasure finder’ (gter ston), who has a connection with the guru who concealed the teaching (mostly Padmasambhava). But that is not the case. In fact, Jigten Gonpo made it very clear through his public teachings that the disparaging of Dharmas such as the treasures revealed by treasure-finders is a great fault.^{♦ 1}

This aspect was of course of great interest for Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa, who held many treasure lineages. In his commentary on the dGongs gcig on this point he defends treasure teachings against attacks, saying:

All the [mahayana] instructions of the Buddha remained hidden [before they surfaced] ^{♦ 2} and the tantras of the Glorious Four-Armed Lord [Mahakala] were taken from a stupa!

And, moreover, he also quotes the famous words of Lord Maitreya from the Uttaratantrashastra 5.19]:

Whatever has been expounded by those of a perfectly undistracted mind
solely in accordance with the teachings of the Victorious One
and conducive to the path for obtaining liberation,
I also place on my head like the Buddha’s [own] instruction.

This can again be understood in the context of dGongs gcig1.1, according to which the Buddha didn’t invent the Dharma (and thus only what is stated by him alone would be Dharma), but he only discovered and revealed the true reality that is true and valid at all times and in all regions of the universe. That means that other beings, too, can discover the Dharma, but it is still not possible that what they discover—if it is true reality—would contradict what the Buddha had said. Such teachings can therefore also be traced to the Buddha, they are neither ‘pilfered’ nor ‘self-fabricated.’ Yet, still, who would be able to discover Dharma in such a way? Since no one enters the bodhisattva stages without gathering the necessary accumulations in this and in previous life times, and since these enormous amounts of spiritual merit can only be accumulated by following the instructions of authentic teachers, no one discovers the Dharma without an authentic transmission lineage. And furthermore, if a short lineage is authentic, there certainly must be an authentic transmission from the one who conceals the teaching to the one who recovers it.

Thus to claim that a short lineage is more authentic and has more blessing power than a long one is simple beside the point. A lineage is only authentic when its transmission of words, meaning, pledges, and blessing is unbroken. Any Dharma taught in a lineage that is like that is profound and marvellous, no matter how long or short its lineage is.

Notes

^{1. [See for instance Jigten Gonpo’s collected works (Dehra Dun edition), vol. 1, p. 180: “Some defame the instructions of the Tathagatas, saying things like ‘only this Dharma of mine is Dharma, what the others practise is not Dharma,’ ‘the mantra of the Nyingmapas is not Dharma,’ ‘the practice of Vajrapani is not Dharma,’ and ‘mental inactivity (amanasikara) is not Dharma.’ They create attachment, aversion and delusion. Since the ripening [of such conduct] with the result ‘samsara’ and ‘lower realms’ is pitiful, having seen and heard a great number of scriptures of the Sugata with your eye of discriminating wisdom arising from study, reflection and practice, you should never disparage (gang la yang skur ba mi ’debs) [any teaching]!”]↩}

^{2. [Andreas Doctor (Tibetan Treasure Literature: Revelation, Tradition, and Accomplishment in Visionary Buddhism, Snow Lion Publications, Ithaca, New York, 2005: pp. 17 and 35) has shown that the apologetic argument, that “commonalities between the Treasures and the generally accepted Indian Mahayana canons” existed can be found as early as Ratna gLing-pa Rin-chen-dpal (1403-1478/79).]↩}

Top of Article ↑