In general, a view is a particular way of considering something. It is an opinion that is held by someone, and often bias plays a role in forming views. In philosophy or religion, the principles underlying views and opinions form tenets (“what is held”). Not everyone must hold a view, not to speak of forming tenets. Dorje Sherab points out that two types of people don’t: those who don’t know what is to be accepted and what is to be abandoned have no view. And, as we will see, those who have realised the original nature have, as a consequence, abandoned all views. We will return to these latter group in a moment.

Among those who hold views are non-Buddhists and Buddhists. It is often said that non-Buddhists hold views of eternalism or nihilism. From a Buddhist perspective, eternalists hold the opinion that phenomena and consciousness are inherently existing, either by their own nature or due to a god’s creative activity. Many Indian ascetic groups belong to this category. Nihilists, on the other hand, are in the Buddhist context defined as people who hold that there are no previous or future existences. As a consequence they don’t see a reason to believe in karmic causes and results. Among Buddhists there are those who base their philosophical views on an analysis of the mind into moments and of appearances into atomic particles. Other Buddhists hold the view that all phenomena are only one’s own mind. Still others hold in addition to that the view that neither phenomena nor mind itself exist. Among all these there are many sub-groups, and each of them have created their own system of tenets, where they place their own view above all others.

All such views that are cultivated through hearing teachings and reflecting on them, and through investigation and analysis by means of logic and arguments, produce, according to the understanding of the founding fathers of the Kagyüpas, only an “object-universal” (don spyi)—a ‘mind made,’ ‘fabricated,’ ‘conceptualised’ idea or image of the object, which is then made again an object of the mind for the sake of further examination and/or meditative practice. But the object-universal is not the actual thing. Or, when we talk about reality, the object-universal is a conceptualised idea of reality, but not the actual, true, ultimate reality.

Dorje Sherab says in the context of dGongs gcig 6.9 that you create a mental object of the moon by analysing it as “made of water-crystal and having the aspects of being white and cooling” (which also shows that object-universals are based on the specifics of a culture). But this conceptualised image in your mind will only be an object-universal, it will never be like looking directly at the moon itself. In this illustration, the ‘looking directly at the moon itself’ is compared to the practise of the Kagyüpas, where the realisation of the guru, who is endowed with all the characteristics, is imprinted in a spontaneous non-conceptual manner on the mind of the disciple, who has gathered the accumulations of merit and wisdom and who has cultivated the ultimate devotion of seeing the guru as the dharmakaya. Phagmodrupa is quoted, saying:

Even if you realise [emptiness through] listening and reflecting [to be] like space,
there is no occasion when [that emptiness] is pure, since it is covered by the clouds of thoughts.
Even if you practise a mind made emptiness for eons,
there is no occasion when you will be free from being entangled in golden fetters.
Whichever thing objectified and [endowed with] characteristics you may practise,
how will you [thereby] be able to realise the sphere of reality (dharmata) that is without proliferation and appearance?

Coming back to the question of what the Drikungpa’s view is, Jigten Gönpo himself says in the dGongs gcig (6.7): ‘[Holding] a view’ is ‘[to be] endowed with realisation.’

In his opinion, views concerning ultimate reality that are ascertained through philosophical tenets, authoritative quotations, and reasoning, are merely a theoretical understanding. Since such an understanding does not even touch the realisation of the nature of mind, they are “the thing to be abandoned.” Even though the Drikungpa accepts the authoritative quotations and analytical arguments of the view of emptiness, he maintains that the actual view cannot be cultivated through conceptualisation, since such a view is “bound through the fetters of grasping as real and attachment to a truth” (rDo sher ma 6.7). Acarya Nagarjuna is quoted (Mulamadhyamakakarika 27.30), saying:

I prostrate to Gautama,
who, out of loving compassion,
taught the excellent Dharma
in order to relinquish all views.

This, Dorje Sherab states, is like Milarepa, who, having been asked what his view is, replied “I have no view.” As Phagmodrupa said:

The ultimate view is free from anything to be seen and any seeing.

Therefore, concludes Dorje Sherab, “our tradition does in general not apply the label ‘view,’” and he quotes Jigten Gönpo, saying:

All views are certainly just grasped and grasping. Grasped and grasping is delusion and cognitive misorientation. … Since all views are particulars of the minds of people, we do not maintain a view.

But aren’t all the teachings of the Buddha taught as the triad of view, practise, and conduct? Dorje Sherab replies:

[Here ‘view’] refers to having realisation, which arises from the gathering of the dependent origination of [authentic] master and [devoted] disciple. It is the realisation that all phenomena of samsara and nirvana are one’s own mind and that the mind is the dharmakaya free from the extremes of proliferation.

Or in the words of Rinchen Jangchub:

We maintain that the condition on one’s own side is to attend with the culmination of devotion to the guru who is endowed with characteristics, that the condition on the side of others is the blessing of the guru who is endowed with characteristics, [and that that which] arises from the gathering [of such a] dependent origination is that one realises all phenomena of samsara and nirvana as one’s own mind, and one realises that mind as the dharmakaya that is without the extremes of proliferation.

In English, French, German etc., the word ‘profound’ goes back to Latin profundus , meaning ‘deep.’ It is made up of the two elements pro ‘before’ and fundus ‘bottom.’ From earliest times it was used in the sense of “showing deep insight.” In that sense it is most often used referring to a subject or thought that demands deep study or thought. A “profound truth” is usually something that is not visible on first sight, is hidden or deep, and needs much study and thought to be understood. The Tibetan term for the noun is zab pa (adj. zab mo ). So we may speak of a ‘profound instruction’ (zab khrid ), a ‘profound view’ (zab mo lta ba ), a ‘profound meaning’ (zab mo’i don ), or a ‘profound path’ (zab lam ). Such a usage indicates depth and subtlety at the same time.

In the dGongs gcig we find a discussion of profoundness in the fifth chapter, where the general opinion is cited that “pith instructions of [the tantric practises of] channels and winds are more profound than [other teachings] such as the three vows.” Obviously the opinion is chiefly based on an understanding of profoundness as ‘most subtle.’ In this sense, the instructions on practises of the vehicle of mantra, such as on the channels and winds of the vajra body are considered profound, because they are extremely subtle practises. Here Jigten Sumgön says (5.14): “What is profound for others, is not profound [for us]; what is not profound [for others] is profound [for us],” and, as we shall see, he seems to build on an understanding of profoundness as something that reaches deep, is deeply grounded, and is therefore something that everything else is based upon, and without which other things could not even exist.

Thus Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa says in his commentary: “As the later result does not arise without a cause that is accomplished earlier, and as all the fortunes of the Cakravartin king first depend on his birth in the royal family and the gradual perfection of his physical and mental faculties, so, too, the vajrayana path of maturation and liberation, which is profound in [the view of] others, has no support if it lacks the vows of refuge, pratimoksha, and of the bodhisattvas, and so forth, which are not profound for others, and for the mantra vows to arise, the two lower vows are indispensable.”

The same idea is very clearly expressed in the Indian tantric siddha Advayavajra’s Kudrshtinirghatana with regard to the preliminaries (adikrama ) of tantric practise. ¹ According to Advayavajra, the preliminaries, consisting in this case of such things as taking refuge and the refuge vows, water offerings to Jambhala, cultivation of love, compassion, rejoicing and equanimity, mandala offering, etc., are not merely preliminary, but also primary, in the sense that they are a continuously constituted foundation of tantric practise (Wallis 2003: 204). That is certainly also Jigten Sumgön’s intention, as is clearly stated in dGongs gcig 2.14: “All stages of the path are practised in [each] single session.” Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa explains: “In that manner each session is preceded at the beginning by the [first part of the] stages of the path of the three [kinds of] beings, namely the [contemplation of] death, impermanence, the leisures and endowments that are difficult to find, cause and result, and the disadvantages of samsara.” The Rinjangma commentary refers in this context to a teaching by Jayülwa Zhönu Ö (1075-1138), received by Gampopa, according to which it is necessary to practise in the first morning session death and impermanence. Jayülwa is quoted with the words: “Forgetting to practise death and impermanence once in the morning, during that day you will aim only at this life!” Thus Rinchen Jangchub states that it is necessary to cultivate these thoughts from the depth of the heart, and then one contemplates karma, cause, result and the disadvantages of samsara, until all the higher and the lower realms of samsara are understood to be something like a fire-pit or filthy hole. Then one continues the session by cultivating, love, compassion, and the resolve for awakening, etc. Only after such profound fundamentals at the beginning of a session should one continue in the sutra vehicle with the actual practise of the two kinds of selflessness and in the mantra vehicle with the two stages of cultivation and completion.

Our commentaries disagree with those people who claim that such a way of practise came to Tibet only after Atisha. They say that such a method of practising is deeply rooted in the Kagyüpa teachings transmitted by Marpa Lotsava and Ngog Chöku Dorje.

Coming back to the general theme of profoundness, it is also a general opinion that the three higher tantric empowerments are profound, while the vase empowerment, that precedes them, is not. Here Jigten Sumgön maintains that the vase empowerment is the root and the higher empowerments are its branches. He said:

Even though [others] say that the higher supreme empowerments are profound,
I value the vase empowerment greatly.
It is like a basis, a container, and a body,
The other [empowerments] are its particulars.

“Therefore,” says Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa, “as middle and old age do not occur without childhood, similarly the intention is that what is not profound for others is profound [for us, and] it is the supporting ground of the other [subsequent teachings], and the higher storeys are not raised without the lower.” And Dorje Sherab sums up his comments saying: “The dGongs gcig teaches throughout just this topic. (…) If you understand it in this manner, you will understand all the topics of the dGongs gcig .” And Rinchen Jangchub summarises that if the lower Dharmas are lacking, one will not be able to pass beyond samsara even if one practises the profound topics of mantra. The best is certainly that all Dharmas are assembled, but even if the mantra elements that are held by others to be profound are lacking, one may still obtain happiness of samsara and nirvana based only on the pratimoksha. Thus, how profound can those practises of the channels and winds of the vajra body be, when they are useless without the preliminaries? And do we not have to value the preliminaries and pratimoksha most highly, if through practising only them one may obtain nirvana? “Therefore,” he says, “we teach that the lower is profound.”

Note
¹ See Glen Wallis (2003), “Advayavajra’s Instructions on adikarma ,” Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies , pp. 203-230. For Sanskrit editions of the text contained in his Advayavajrasamgraha , see Annual of the Institute for the Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism , Taisho University,” no. 10, (March 1988): 255-198, and Gaekwad’s Oriental Series , vol. 40, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927.

It amazes me again and again how the dGongs gcig 800 years ago engages in topics that are still discussed in the present day. The commentary of Dorje Sherab of the middle of the 13th century has the wonderful habit to always describe at the beginning of each new topic the general views of Tibetan Buddhists at that time. This serves directly the purpose to introduce the reason why Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo found it necessary to provide a correction of that view. But it also helps us to understand what the general understanding of Buddhism has been at that time. ¹ And most often we find exactly those same views that are criticised by Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo still current today. The dGongs gcig has in eight centuries not lost its freshness and topicality.

The topic I want to introduce today is found in the fifth chapter (5.9) and discusses the relation between the disciple’s faculties and the nature of the rituals that fit with those faculties. The general view is as follows. Engagement in vajrayana requires trainees of highest faculties. Within that supreme category there are again supreme, medium, and lower types. Those of lowest faculties among the persons of supreme faculties are to be consecrated into a coloured dust particle mandala, the medium types are consecrated with the help of a drawing on a piece of cloth, and the supreme ones only need to be supported by a mandala made of small heaps. Furthermore, those of lowest faculties will have to practise the complete stage of cultivation, the medium ones are to perform cultivation based on the seed syllable, and for the supreme ones instantaneous perfect awareness (skad cig dran rdzogs) suffices (which is synonymous with ‘instantaneous cultivation,’ dkrongs bskyed, i.e. ‘sudden’ and ‘all-at-once’ cultivation of the deity). Still furthermore, the lowest ones have to perform detailed practise rituals, the medium ones medium rituals, and the supreme ones do not need a ritual at all, because without mental constructions and having exhausted mind and phenomena, instantaneous perfect awareness practise is enough, or, if necessary, an abbreviated ritual can be performed. So far the general view.

Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo does not agree. In fact, he maintains the exact opposite (5.9): “All the detailed rituals are especially necessary for those of highest faculties.”

Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa explains that those trainees of medium and lowest faculties (among the supreme ones) hardly have the ability to comprehend detailed rituals. But for those of highest faculties, detailed rituals are indeed very important, since if someone in the best case has realised emptiness as cause and result, he will produce each individual quality through all of the various dependent originations of the ritual. Now, in order to begin to comprehend this point, we have to digress a little.

Ritual in the context of cause, result, and emptiness
Mahayana Buddhism, of which vajrayana is a special form, does not only aim for personal liberation. In fact, personal liberation can only be a preliminary step necessary to achieve the liberation of all sentient beings. The bodhisattva’s bodhicitta—the resolve to obtain awakening for the sake of all sentient beings—is a defining characteristic of the mahayana, and it stands at the beginning of that path. At the end of that path the bodhisattva has, motivated by loving kindness, compassion, and bodhicitta, cultivated inconceivably many qualities, which are necessary to be able to carry out those equally inconceivably many activities that achieve the benefit of the beings. In short, it is often said that one strives to accomplish the dharmakaya for one’s own sake and the two form-kayas (the sambhogakaya and the nirmanakaya) for the benefit of others.

All of our commentaries stress the fact that the inconceivable qualities and activities (embodied through the two form-kayas) arise as the result of the detailed rituals. But these qualities do not arise merely by reading those rituals out aloud. If that would be the case, there would be no need for supreme faculties in order to perform detailed rituals. Instead even a well trained parrot would be able to achieve those Buddha qualities. According to Dorje Sherab, however, the qualities only arise when the ritual is performed within a state of realised emptiness, since from within that state, all the specific dependent originations of cause and result will manifest that cause the Buddha qualities and activities to arise. This understanding is based on Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo’s teaching known as “the vital point of entering into cause and result as emptiness, and of emptiness arising as cause and result.”

Dorje Sherab dwells on this point in his introduction to the dGongs gcig. ² There he explains three aspects, of which the second one is the vital point mentioned above:

(1) applying cause and result to emptiness on the path (lam la rgyu ‘bras stong nyid du ‘jug pa)
(2) the arising of emptiness as cause and result on the path (lam la … stong nyid rgyu ‘bras su ‘byung ba)
(3) the non-dual existence of emptiness, cause, and result on the path (lam la … de gnyis su med par gnas pa)

(1) Applying cause and result to emptiness on the path
Of these three the first is the understanding that whatever arises from causes and conditions is unborn and empty of own existence. This is the truth of dependent origination of causes and conditions that is understood when one dwells in the nature, practising free from proliferation. That realisation is the ‘entering into the state of emptiness-equipoise’ (mnyam gzhag stong nyid). And that entering into the meditative state is called ‘the ground at the time of freedom from proliferation,’ which, as shall be clear, refers to the second of the four yogas of mahamudra (the meditative state of freedom from mental proliferation). ³

(2) The arising of emptiness as cause and result on the path
Secondly, and this is the relevant point for our discussion of detailed rituals, when one experiences the ‘one-taste’ (ro gcig) within the reality of dependent origination of causes and conditions, then all the fine details (spu ris) of causes and results each arise without loss from the state of emptiness. This is really a core of Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo’s teachings, namely, in short, that within emptiness nothing is lost. That is the reason why based on the two accumulations realisation is possible, and that is also the reason why the Drikungpa insists (like his teachers Phagmodrupa and like Gampopa) that whoever has realised emptiness has to pay greatest attention to cause and result. And that is also the reason why Mipham Rinpoche praised Kyobpa Jigten Gönpo, saying:

May as long as the world exists
the teaching of the victorious Drikungpa,
the Omniscient Lord and master of dependent origination,
continue through listening, reflecting, and practising.

This “arising of the fine details of cause and result” is the great stage of unity, and it is for instance called the ‘unity of the path’ (lam gyi zung ‘jug) or the ‘unity of [the stage of] learning’ (slob pa’i zung ‘jug). It is achieved on the path at the time of ‘single taste,’ which is the third of the four yogas of mahamudra.

(3) Non-dual existence of emptiness, cause, and result on the path
Thirdly, since such a unity, or ‘single taste,’ or non-dual existence is non other than ‘dependent origination,’ one understands that the ultimate original nature of the dependent origination of cause and result arises perfectly without mixing up all the individual ways of the arising of “this result from that cause.” Thus when that beginningless non-dual inseparability of ground, path, and result in all respects is actualised, the non-duality of meditative equipoise and post-meditative equipoise is achieved, which is also known as the ‘union of the result’ (‘bras bu zung ‘jug) or the ‘union of [the stage of] no more learning’ (mi slob pa’i zung ‘jug).’ And that union is also described as ‘the result at the time of no more learning,’ which is the fourth of the four yogas of mahamudra.

Ritual approach of beginners and advanced practitioners
The principle point of performing detailed rituals is, according to all our commentaries, to cause the arising of inconceivable many qualities and activities. There is, however, one further interesting aspect that is mentioned in some detail by Dorje Sherab. He states that with regard to the manners of practising the path, there is a principle (gtso bo) and an ancillary way (read: zhar ‘byung). The principle practise done by a beginner is the direct realisation of discriminating awareness (shes rab mngon [gsum du] rtogs [pa]). Those who have not yet obtained stability in that should perform the deity practise as an ancillary to their main practise. In that ancillary practise they merely remain aware (dran tsam) of the deity, while they chiefly work to realise discriminating awareness. For that purpose the stages of the ritual should be condensed. Then, once they have mastered emptiness, actualising all phenomena to be like space, they directly perceive within that state the dependent origination of cause and result (as explained in our digression above). And in that state they practise through detailed rituals the support of the celestial palace and the supported, namely the deities of the mandala with all the different body colours and their various attributes. To sum it up, Dorje Sherab says “thus through the vital point of entering into cause and result as emptiness, and of emptiness arising as cause and result, there is no chance that [the result] will not appear.”

Notes
¹ You might object here that the presentation of the opinions of others in Tibetan texts is often quite polemical in nature and rarely a fair description of the actual view that is to be criticised. The purpose of citing them is usually that thereby they are presented in such a way, that they can be attacked more easily. Therefore, as a rule, it is always important to double check with the actual writings of the criticised ones. But here in our commentary by Dorje Sherab, the views that are cited are rarely of a particular opponent. Instead they are rather fairly widespread opinions that can occasionally even be found among his own fellow Kagyüpas.

² Khog dbub, p. 231 f. of the 2007 Kagyu College edition.

³ The four yogas of mahamudra are (1) one-pointed concentration, (2) freedom from mental proliferation, (3) one-taste, and (4) no more practise/training.

The reasons given for the consumption of meat and alcohol in Buddhist tantric rituals and in everyday life, and the reasons for prohibiting the consumption of meat and alcohol have always interested me. I’ve been involved in many discussions about these points and I have also witnessed numerous discussions of Western converts, especially about meat, sometimes involving such folklore arguments as “Tibetans must eat meat because they can’t grow vegetables in the mountains,” or “a yogi eats meat to make a connection to the animal in future lives,” sometimes more sophisticated arguments involving analyses of texts of all three vehicles of Buddhism. It turned out that Jigten Gönpo took a pretty clear position on these points, but more on that below. Let us first look at some general topics. ¹

1. Is Buddhism “pro-vegetarianism”?
Debates between vegetarians (in their many forms) and meat eaters tend to get tangled up, especially within a frame such as Buddhist spirituality, in what seem to be moral issues, or in apologetics of the above mentioned type. I think it is save to say that if people should ever consider themselves pro-vegetarianism because their are Buddhists, then this is due to reasons that are perhaps quite different from the reasons put forward in discussions within a Western cultural frame. Let us briefly review the chief topics in all three vehicles of Buddhism.

1.1. The avoiding of direct harm to others
Numerous Tibetan texts state that the basis of self-liberation (pratimoksha) is “to avoid harming other sentient beings, together with the mental basis for that.” That, of course, includes the killing of animals, “even down to the tiniest insects.” Why should one avoid the killing of any being? Because the doctrine of karma informs us that killing any sentient being would entail negative karmic consequences that cause us to remain in samsara and to fall into the unpleasant animal or hell realms. It should be noted, however, that the Buddha did not teach an extreme form of asceticism, where even a harm involuntarily inflicted to a tiny insect would have a karmic consequence. According to the systematised presentations of the abhidharma, four aspects must be complete in order to cause karmic consequences to occur: (1) basis or object: one must have a clear perception of the ‘victim,’ that is, accidentally stepping on an insect or mistaking e.g. a small snake for a rope (and stepping on it) is not a problem. ² (2) Intention: every karmically effective act must be preceded by a volition or intention. Without that, it is just an involuntary accident. (3) Preparation: this includes all the necessary activities of preparation up to the actual blow that kills the other sentient being. (4) Completion: to make an act complete in a karmic sense, one must recognise that one’s activity has led to the intended result—such as the death of the animal—and one has to feel a certain satisfaction about that. It is usually taught that if these four aspects are not complete, an act is more or less involuntary, accidental, or unconscious, and as a consequence there will be no or only a mild karmic retribution “as in a dream.”

Important for our discussion is that eating meat does not directly fulfil any of the above four aspects. By eating meat, one does not directly involve oneself in the killing of the animal—neither through perceiving the animal as such, forming the intention to kill it, carrying out the actual act, and feeling satisfied about it. This is, however, only so in the context of a consumer who buys “available meat” on the market. If, on the other hand, one instigates or even orders others to kill an animal, that is karmically speaking the same as doing the killing oneself. The Buddha has therefore carefully ruled that monks should not accept meat that was killed for their benefit, and that they should therefore inquire about the circumstances when being offered a meal that includes meat.

But not to be directly or indirectly involved in the killing is not the only reason why monks and nuns should distance themselves from the killer and the killing as far as possible. It is also the case that accepting meat that has been killed directly for one’s benefit wouldn’t fit well with the attitude of loving kindness that is to be cultivated. On the other hand, an ordained person has the important function to serve as a field of merit for lay people: the offering of food to the monks and nuns is the householders primary source of merit in early Buddhism. The ordained ones therefore must carefully balance out their avoidance of even very indirect involvement with killing and their important function as fields of merit for the householders.

In sum, those concerned with their own liberation can eat meat without obtaining the karmic consequences of killing, provided they only consume meat that was “already available.”

There were a number of taboo meats. These will also play a role in the ritual consumption of meat, such as elephant and horse meat that were taboo because of being symbols of royalty, dog and snake meat, which were taboo since these were seen as impure and revolting (Schmithausen 2005: 189). Prohibited was also the meat of the lion, tiger, leopard, bear and hyena. The reason was self protection: it was believed that these predators could smell if someone had eaten their kin and thus they would perhaps attack such a person (Harvey 2001: 159; McDermott 1989: 274). ³

1.2. The bodhisattva’s conflict with meat consumption
While among those, who sought to obtain liberation for themselves, the main problem of meat consumption was its proximity to the killing, which was circumnavigated by keeping a distance to the actual act of the killing, mahayana sutras such as the Lankavatara (p. 257, verse 12) deny that there is such a thing as ‘unproblematic meat.’ The verse states clearly that there is never is ‘permitted’ or ‘pure meat.’ The argument that the buyer of the meat is not involved in the killing, because the meat is already available when he comes to the market, is not accepted anymore. The Lankavatara Sutra acknowledges explicitly that buying meat instigates killing:

If … meat would not be eaten by anybody, they [the butchers] would not destroy their [the animals’] cause of existence (nidanam). (LS 252,15-16) ⁴

Thus eating meat indirectly links up to the killing: buying the meat instigates the butcher to do his job.

But there are also other important ideas expressed now, for instance that the desire for the taste of meat is an addiction. And that, of course, is a direct cause for negative karma accumulated by the one who consumes the meat. Among the evil that ensues from that is birth among carnivorous animals such as lions, tigers, leopards, wolfs, hyenas, wild-cats, jackals and owls. Moreover, there is also the danger that one will be born from the wombs of awful demons, or from the womb of a female demon, such as a yakshasi, and into the tribe of meat-eaters (LS 252.5-10), and one is born ill smelling, contemptible, insane and so forth (LS 257-258, verse14). In short, it is clear that with such a rebirth it will be very difficult to return to human birth, let alone to a bodhisattva career.

The Lankavatara Sutra is also concerned with the fate of those who catch and slaughter fish and other animals, since to do that they must develop a certain cruelty and will therefore not be able to cultivate compassion (LS 252,16-253,9)—not to mention birth in hell as a retribution for the actual act of killing. The fate of these people, who are instigated to do what they do by those who buy and consume the meat, should concern the bodhisattva, because instead of being able to lead these people to awakening, they slip away into evil fates.

There are also two further spiritual concerns for the bodhisattva. First of all, eating meat contradicts their nature of compassion and loving kindness, because the beings are shaking with horror when they are about to be slaughtered, and also when they smell the bad smell of meat eaters (LS 246,11-13, 252,13-14 and 258, verse 23). Secondly, to eat the meat of other beings is to eat one’s former mothers (245,10-246,4), and also the future Buddhas, because one eats the bodily receptacle of the spiritual principle that is known in these sutras as ‘Buddhanature’ (tathagatagarbha). (Seyfort Ruegg 1980: 236).

In sum, according to these sutras, bodhisattvas must consider themselves linked up to the actual killing by eating meat, they will suffer severe consequences themselves, and they cause others to suffer by instigating them to continue their evil craft and trade. All those Tibetan lamas who gave up eating meat refer to one or several arguments given in these sutras for becoming vegetarians. ⁵

1.3. Meat and mantra
There is some evidence that the consumption of meat and alcohol was prohibited in lower tantras, such as in ‘action tantra.’ Jamgon Kongtrul reports that the Susiddhi Tantra teaches 18 pledges, of which the 10th says: “do not eat food that is not permitted,” and the great Drukpa Kagyü master Padma Karpo explains that these include meat and alcohol (Kongtrul 1998: 233, 461 n. 86). I have not seen any arguments for this prohibition (but I have also not extensively searched for them here). One might assume, though, that these prohibitions have to do with purity and proper discipline, because at the same time such texts also teach to wash oneself and keep clean, and not to use garlic, onions, radish, sour drinks and so forth.

On the other hand, it is well known that meat and alcohol is prescribed in the highest yoga tantras for certain ritual purposes. Many of these tantras mention for instance the necessity to consume the ‘five meats’ and ‘five nectars.’ It should be noted, however, that these are not the regular meats one can buy on the market, because they are exactly those above mentioned taboo foods, namely the meat of cow, dog, horse, elephant, and of human beings. The great Patrul Rinpoche says (p. 190): “These five kinds of meat are undefiled by harmful action because they are all creatures which are not killed for food.” That is to say that the five kinds of meat used in the rituals of the highest yoga tantras are to be gathered from animals and human beings that have died of natural causes. But not only that. The Samputa Tantra, for instance, which is an important tantra belonging to the cycle of Hevajra and Cakrasamvara, says: ⁶

Having drunk dog, donkey, camel, and elephant blood, one should regularly feed on their flesh. Human flesh smeared with the blood of all species of animals is beloved. Entirely vile meat full of millions of worms is divine. Meat rendered putrid by shit, seething with hundreds of maggots, mixed with dog and human vomit, with a coating of piss—mixed with shit it should be eaten by the yogin with gusto.

Wether such passages are to be read literally or not is not the point of our discussion here. But what is quite clear is that the meat mentioned here for consumption by the yogi is not procured by slaughtering a living being, and it is not meat that is normally eaten to allay one’s hunger for food. In a provisional sense, the flesh of animals who have died naturally might be consumed by the yogi “in order to shatter arrogance about one’s social status and personal pride” (Kongtrul, p. 255). This, however, only makes sense when one lives in a country (such as India), where the consumption of such foods is a taboo. If one would culturally translate such a praxis into the Western cultural sphere, where all kinds of meat and alcohol are publicly consumed, one would probably have to eat human flesh and drink excrements to achieve the same result of being seen (and seeing oneself) as an ‘impure’ outcast. Dharmashri (as quoted by Kongtrul) also mentions that in a definite (and thus not literally) sense ‘to eat meat and drink alcohol’ actually means to stabilise inner bliss etc. and thus refers to yogic practises (and not to eating and drinking), and Kongtrul adds that in reality such training is done on the forth level (bhumi) of the bodhisattvas.

Another interesting ritual aspect is the tantric offering of ‘red meat’ by placing it on the mandala or offering it to the wrathful Dharma protectors. In this context, Patrul Rinpoche refers to Dagpo Rinpoche (Gampopa), who said (p. 191):

Taking the still warm flesh and blood of a freshly slaughtered animal and placing it in the mandala would make all the wisdom deities faint. It is also said that offering to the wisdom deities the flesh and blood of a slaughtered animal is like murdering a child in front of its mother.

And Patrul Rinpoche continues:

If you perform rituals like the offering prayer to the protectors using only the flesh and blood of slain animals, it goes without saying that the wisdom deities and the protectors of the Buddha’s doctrine, who are all pure Bodhisattvas, will never accept those offerings of slaughtered beings laid out like meat on a butcher’s counter. They will not even come anywhere near. Instead, powerful evil spirits who like warm flesh and blood and are ever eager to do harm will gather round the offering and feast on it.

Finally it is often said that meat and alcohol are necessary substances to be consumed in a tarntric feast (Skr. ganacakra, Tib. tshogs ‘khor). In general, Jigten Sumgön says in a letter to all of his disciples (vol. 3, p. 377):

Om Svasti. The precious guru said: “I offer this to my disciples residing in all directions. If the ones who say that they are my disciples destroy the teachings by calling eating meat and drinking alcohol ‘tantric feast,’ I have no connection with them. They injure the precious teachings of the Buddha. Since that is not in accordance with the fourteen and fifteen pledges of secret mantra and their limbs, these [peoples’] pledges have been corrupted. They have deceived Phagmodrupa, the precious protector of the three worlds. Since that is not in accordance with [the guru’s] life of liberation, they slander those [noble] beings of the past. (…) Please take this to heart!”

And in another text (vol. 6, p. 132 f.) he does teach the preparation of the five meats and five nectars, but he says that this is done placing oneself first in the sameness of mahamudra, where all good, bad, clean, and filthy things are of one taste, without any deviation from that. Jigten Gönpo’s main thrust in his teachings on these matters has always been to present a single intention (dgongs gcig), emphasising the unity of the teachings, for instance when he said (5.24):

That which is virtue in the vinaya is virtue also in the mantra, and that which is non-virtue [in the vinaya] is non-virtue [also in the mantra].

This is in the commentaries explicitly explained in connection with the use of alcohol by tantric yogis. Dorje Sherab states in his commentary on this point (Sobisch 1998: 379 ff.):

Through the three syllables Om A Hum one transforms the colour [of alcohol] and [it is] like milk; one transforms the smell and taste and [it is] like salt-water; one transforms the potency and by merely drinking [this nectar] remaining free from intoxication and drunkenness [one is] able to realize the innate simultaneously arisen primordial wisdom. For example, the great brahmin [Saraha] resorted to the alcohol of the skull cup, and if something such as the arising [of] the realisation of the mind itself, [i.e.] mahamudra, occurs, [that] was taught [by the Buddha] as the pledge of mantra. If such [a thing] occurs, how could it be prohibited even in the vinaya and again for the non-tantric [mahayana] tradition? [It] is a great absolute permission!

Thus when the tantric adept is indeed able to transform the alcohol held in the receptacle of the skull cup into a blazing, whitish ambrosia whose consumption immediately awakens primordial wisdom, than he must drink it, whether he is an ordained monk or not. But if he is not able to do that, even if he is a yogi, he is not permitted to drink it—because it is alcohol, and not nectar. Dorje Sherab also points out that alcohol as such has never been taught in the tantras as nectar. Instead the tantras speak of excrement, urine, blood, semen, and human flesh (Kongtrul 472 n. 145) when they refer to the ‘five nectars.’ Thus Dorje Sherab explains that if one thinks that one has to use alcohol in a tantric feast …

… one [should] equalize [alcohol and excrements], and having mixed as much alcohol as one will drink with that great nectar [i.e. excrement], one should drink it. If one cannot bear that because of its stench, the nectar does not exist anywhere (…).

Notes
¹ I would like to thank my student Louise Broskov Hansen for the many interesting discussions we’ve had during the fall semester of 2012. Many of the points mentioned here came up in our B.A. colloquium and have been incorporated into her thesis, which she defended successfully in January 2013. She has also provided all references to the Lankavatara Sutra.

² Interestingly Jigten Gönpo points out in another context that such behaviour is not entirely without negative consequences, in so far as such ‘accidents’ are caused by a lack of awareness, which itself leads to negative consequences. These consequences, however, are not caused directly by the accidental deed, but by one’s lack of awareness.

³ I owe these references to Louise.

⁴ Translation from Sanskrit by Louise Boskov.

⁵ A small sample of famous vegetarians in Tibet that I came across in my readings includes Yang Gönpa, Jonang Dolpopa, Lama Zhang, Karmapa VII Chödrag Gyatsho, Jetsun Dragpa Gyaltshen, Patrul Rinpoche, and Jigten Gönpo.

⁶ This passage was published by Christian Wedemeyer in his new book Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism. I have not yet seen the actual print, but in a draft it appeared right at the beginning of the introduction.

Bibliography
Harvey, Peter (2001) An introduction to Buddhist Ethics; foundations, values and issues, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kongtrul, Jamgön (1998) Buddhist Ethics, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications.

McDermott, James P. (1989) “Animals and humans in early Buddhism,” Indo-Iranian Journal 32, no. 4 (Oct.1989), 269-280.

Patrul Rinpoche (1998) The Words of My Perfect Teacher, Boston: Shambhala.

Schmithausen, Lambert (2005) “Meat-eating and nature: Buddhist perspectives,” Supplement to the Bulletin of the research institute of Bukkyo University.

Seyfort Ruegg, David (1980) “Ahimsa and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism,” Buddhist Studies in Honor of Walpola Rahula, London: Gordon Fraser, 234-241.

Sobisch, Jan-Ulrich (2002) Three-Vow Theories in Tibetan Buddhism: A Comparative Study of Major Traditions from the Twelfth Through Nineteenth Centuries, (Contributions to Tibetan Studies 1), Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag.

I found an interesting short passage in Dorje Sherab’s commentary (on dGongs gcig 4.15) where he deals with Jigten Gönpo’s attitude towards the followers of the so-called ‘lower vehicle’ (which we should really rather call the ‘vehicle of shravakas’), namely the ‘hearers’ (shravaka) and ‘solitary Buddhas’ (pratyekabuddhas). It might be objected that this can only be a ‘theoretical attitude,’ because shravakas and a lower vehicle did not exist in Tibet. But according to Jigten Gönpo’s definition of the difference between the ‘lower’ and the ‘greater vehicle’ (in dGongs gcig 1.21), one might have second thoughts. The definition says: “The difference between hinayana and mahayana is the resolve for awakening that is cultivated.” ‘Resolve’ refers here to the special resolve for awakening for the sake of all sentient beings. The shravakas do also resolve to obtain awakening, yet their primary motivation is their revulsion at samsara, the resultant renunciation, and their desire to obtain liberation for themselves, not their compassion for others. Thus as long as one has not cultivated the bodhisattva’s resolve with the wish to liberate all beings, one is still, according to this definition, on the level of a shravaka.

There seem to be some instances of denigrating images and language against shravakas in the mahayana (calling their vehicle ‘lower’ being just one example). In the Mahayanasutralamkara (13.15) we read for instance:

[For] the intelligent [bodhisattvas] to stay continuously in hell
is not an obstruction of the stainless, vast awakening.
The very blissful remaining [that is taught] in the other [i.e. lower] vehicles, however,
the thought of great ease, and the benefiting of oneself, causes obstructions.

In short, being in hell does not obstruct great awakening, but being a shravaka does. And in tantric literature we might read that the tantric yogi is not allowed to stay “more than seven days among shravakas.” ¹ It is apparent that there has been a tangible tension between these groups in India. On the other hand, we have reports from Chinese Buddhist pilgrims in India like Fa-shien (early 5th c.) and Hsüan-tsang (7th c.), who noticed that in many Indian monasteries shravakas continued to live side by side with mahayanists. ²

The tension found its expression also in derogatory statements about the spiritual levels achieved by shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. In our commentary, Dorje Sherab reports that there were people who claimed that “even the first [bodhisattva] level is not seen by shravakas and pratyekabuddhas.” In contrast to that he presents Jigten Gönpo’s vajra utterance 4.15, according to which “up to the sixth [bodhisattva] level, the realisation is in common with the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas.” In other words, no matter how different the two groups might have thought, lived, and practised, a substantial part of their achievements were the same. To illustrate that, Dorje Sherab borrows from the Dashabhumikasutra (Derge vol. 36, fols. 233v ff.) the example of the prince (= bodhisattva) and the minister’s son (= shravaka). He says:

Take, for instance, a prince and the son of a minister, who are of the same age. Are their qualities different? As the young prince outshines even an old minister through his [blood]-line (rigs), whoever possesses the resolve for awakening is of the mahayana Buddha family, and therefore even the beginning bodhisattva outshines all shravakas and pratyekabuddhas through his family.

This goes back to the idea of different Buddha families, as for instance mentioned in Gampopa’s Jewel Ornament: ³

The cut-off family, the dubious-family,
the shravaka-family, the pratyekabuddha-family,
and the family of followers of the mahayana way of life …

Quotes like these are found in mahayana sources that seek to establish that entering into the family of bodhisattvas turns one into a being with much greater potential than the shravakas possess. Thus even a beginning bodhisattva outshines through his sheer potential all others. Yet, as Dorje Sherab continues:

Through realisation they [i.e. the bodhisattvas] are not able to outshine them [i.e. the shravakas] up to the sixth level, like the deeds of a young prince does not outshine the deeds of great ministers. Having reached the seventh level and upwards they are able to outshine them through both family and realisation.

In other words, the superiority of the bodhisattvas over shravakas (and pratyekabuddhas) up to the sixth bhumi is only due to their potential, not through their actual realisation. Nevertheless the bodhisattva must be worshipped and venerated by the others, as Dorje Sherab explains:

Secondly, even if the sons of the king and the minister are of equal age, the prince is exalted through his family. Therefore the minister’s son must pay his respect and venerate him. Similarly, here [shravakas, pratyakabuddhas and bodhisattvas] are of the same realisation, but shravakas and pratyakabuddhas must worship the bodhisattvas and take them as their gurus.

However, Dorje Sherab adds here that the shravaka’s inferior position is no reason for the bodhisattva to denigrate him:

It is also taught that bodhisattvas must speak honourably (zhe sa bya) to shravakas and pratyekabuddhas. Similarly as soon as the prince is born, the minister who has grown old (na tshod tshad du phyin pa) must venerate and worship him. But [the prince] too should not speak dishonourably to the minister. Even though a bodhisattva, who has comprehended the resolve for awakening for the first time, is not particularly distinguished, the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas—even if they have practised the pure discipline for many hundred thousand eons—must pay homage to him and venerate him. [But] it is taught that the bodhisattva, too, must speak honourably to them.

Even though we find in this passage the usual ranking that is based on membership in the Buddha-families, two aspects are remarkable. First, that Jigten Gönpo teaches (in contrast to some other masters) that bodhisattvas, shravakas, and pratyekabuddha have the same realisation up to the sixth bhumi, ⁴ and secondly, that the bodhisattva should speak honourably to them.

That this latter point is a larger issue for Jigten Gönpo can been gleaned from a passage of his collected teachings, where he says: ⁵

For someone who, after taking refuge to the three jewels, has entered the gate of the precious teachings of the Tathagata, completely all the practises of the different trainings are similarly ‘Dharma.’ But some people defame the instructions of the Tathagata by claiming “only this teaching of mine is Dharma, what others are practising is not Dharma,” or “Nyingmapa-mantra is not Dharma,” or “the practise of the siddha Vajrapani is not Dharma,” ⁶ or “amanasikara is not Dharma,” ⁷ etc. This causes only desire, hatred, and cognitive misorientation for them. The maturation of such activity is the result ‘samsara’ and ‘lower realms.’ Since such results are wailful, you should never denigrate any teaching!

Such an attitude is, no doubt, in sharp contrast to that of some other writers, especially in the philosophical genres. A classical case I have seen is a ‘system of tenets’ (siddhanta, Tib. grub mtha’) text, where one writer accuses another one of not even being a Buddhist—and that while they were both not only mahayanists, but also fellow madhyamikas! The fault of the accused was to belong to the other branch of madhyamaka! ⁸ Jigten Gönpo, on the other hand—and I hope to provide many further examples in the future—always seems to emphasise the unity of the Buddhist teachings. Thus, to take only a few examples from the first chapter, he teaches that

- while it is true that there are 84.000 teachings, they are still all one as a method of achieving Buddhahood (1.2);
- within each of the three wheels of the Buddha’s teachings, all three are complete (1.5);
- neither mantra nor sutra should be lacking, because complete awakening can only be obtained through a combination of both (1.23);
- all vows, whether of individual liberation (pratimoksha), of the bodhisattvas, or of the mantra practitioners, have the same single vital topic, namely their avoiding the ten non-virtuous actions (1.24).

And at the end of that chapter he summarises all by stating: “The intention of the Buddha is the single family and the single vehicle” (1.29). Hence his teaching is known as “The Single Intention” (dGongs gcig).

He is also prepared to admit that “there exist much that is virtuous by nature to be practised in [the systems of] the non-Buddhists (mu stegs pa) too” (1.19). And not only do the non-Buddhists have many virtuous practises that should be followed by Buddhists, too, but some things are even better understood outside of Buddhism! Here he has in mind for instance the medical specialists, who sometimes have a very profound understanding of how the rough and subtle channels of the body, the primary and secondary winds that move in them, etc., and their vital essences are, and they also know how to bestow life (‘tsho ba’i srog ster ba) in very profound ways (5.13).

Notes

¹ Alexander Berzin, Taking the Kalachakra Initiation, Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1997, p. 110. Berzin explains, however, that here ‘shravaka’ means “anyone who trivializes or makes fun of tantra,” which is a nice explanation, but doesn’t really reflect the actual attitude of the usual tantric towards the ‘lower’ vehicle.

² Akira Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism: From Shakyamuni to Early Mahayana, transl. Paul Groner, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993, p. 244.

³ The Jewel Ornament of Liberation by sGam-po-pa, translated and annotated by Herbert V. Guenther, Boston and London: Shambala, 1986, p. 3. See also the various books and articles by D. Seyfort Ruegg, such as his dissertation La théorie du tathagatagarbha et du gotra (Paris 1969) and “The Meaning of the Term Gotra and Textual History of Ratnagotravibhaga,” BSOAS 39 (1976) 341-363.

⁴ The reason for that is chiefly that the achievements on those bodhisattva levels, such as realisation of the four noble truths, of dependent origination, and of cessation, are also taught in the sutras for shravaka-arhats and pratyekabuddhas.

⁵ This passage can be found in the Dehra Dun edition of Jigten Gönpo’s collected works in vol. 1, p. 181.

⁶ This refers to those who claim that the tantras are not part of the Buddha’s teachings.

⁷ This refers to those who claim that mental inactivity is not Dharma. This topic has been debated during the great debate at Samye between the Chinese master Hwashang Mohoyen and the Indian master Kamalashila.

⁸ See D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Jo nang pas: A School of Buddhist Ontologists According to the Grub Mtha’ sel gyi me long,” JAOS 83 (1963) 84- f., where Thu’u-bkwan Blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma (1737-1802) from A-mdo argues at length that the teachings of the Jo-nang-pa are exactly the same as those of the non-Buddhist sects.

In our dGongs gcig commentaries we find several samples of quotes that are usually offered by those people who hold that a bodhisattva has the power, or permission, to override non-virtue. The most famous quote is perhaps Shantideva’s Bodhicaryavatara 5.84cd:

The Merciful One through far-sightedness allowed them [i.e. the bodhisattvas]
even [these activities] that are prohibited [for others].

Well known is also Candragomin’s Bodhisattvasamvaravimshaka (D fol. 167v):

Because they possess compassion and out of love,
there is no fault for those with a virtuous mind.

And again Shantideva’s Bodhicaryavatara 1.35:

Even through a great [misdeed] no evil can arise for the sons of victors,
[instead] virtue increases by itself.

And Phagmodrupa is quoted with these words:

For the great bodhisattvas who perform great beneficial acts for the sake of others and dwell on the [bodhisattvas’] stages and paths, the seven non-virtuous [deeds] of body and speech are permitted, but the Great Sage, the Lord of Dharma, declared that there is never an opportunity and time when wrong views are permitted.

Typical is also the reference to the well known story of the greatly compassionate captain for whom killing was (alledgedly) no fault, the story of king Kanakavarna for whom there was no fault despite his taking of things not given, and the story of the brahmin Jyotis for whom there was no fault despite his breaking of celibacy (some of these stories will be discussed below).

The general understanding is portrayed in the Rin byang ma. Accordingly the beginning bodhisattva engages in the disciplined conduct of the vows in order to abandon the obscuration of karma. This is done, as in the case of the Buddha, for the duration of one immeasurable eon and until the first bodhisattva level (bhumi) is obtained. Then,

after one has gained strength in that, chiefly the gathering of virtuous factors is practised in order to accomplish completely all ways of (A) making offerings to Buddha, the Exalted One, through the disciplined conduct of the bodhisattva’s dharanis, samadhis, supernormal displays, super-perceptions, and ten powers (dbang rnam pa bcu), and (B) in order to accomplish completely all ways of methods of purifying the Buddhafields and of ripening and liberating sentient beings.

This is again done for the duration of one immeasurable eon and until the eighth bodhisattva level is obtained. “Since thereafter the bodhisattva chiefly brings about the benefit of others, the disciplined conduct of benefiting sentient beings is practised” on the three pure bodhisattva levels again for the period of one immeasurable eon. After obtaining the first bodhisattva level, the bodhisattva is, according to this view, “free from the impediment of falling back (log ltung).” From the eighth bodhisattva level upwards the bodhisattva turns into an expert with regard to methods and “guides the trainees through fitting means in accordance with [the trainees’] aspiration on the path.” If he is, however, not able to place the trainee on the path through the pure (i.e. virtuous) means alone,

that bodhisattva, considering the benefit of others, must guide those sentient beings also by way of the seven non-virtuous actions with body and speech, such as killing, and it is said that no faults arise for him.

In contrast to that, Jigten Gönpo states (dGongs gcig 4.6): “The ‘non-virtuous that does not become a fault’ is not permitted.” This vajra-statement is crucial for the understanding of all of Jigten Gönpo’s teachings of Bodhisattva conduct. I think it is, according to him, first of all necessary to differentiate between ‘being a fault’ and ‘being not permitted.’ The Rin byang ma has in this regard the very clear statement that an activity may be permitted to great bodhisattvas, but faults do arise nonetheless. In such a case, a non-virtuous deed is performed by the bodhisattva, such as killing, “through which, however, [sentient beings’] ripening and liberation of mind occur,” yet “even the Buddha is unable to prevent [the arising of] the result of actions such as killing, because that is the nature.” The crucial point is that the bodhisattva must be able to bear the consequences of his deeds, since such conduct

is permitted from the perspective of whether the bodhisattva[’s conduct] deteriorates through the sufferings of the result of that karma, namely the three lower realms, and whether he is able to bear [the suffering of those realms]. Thus faults arise. Ask yourself: “Will I be able to bear [the suffering] or not?” There is no other question than analysing whether one will be overpowered by sufferings such as hunger, thirst, and freezing and whether one’s virtuous Dharma conduct will [as a result] deteriorate. [Such conduct] is permitted to those bodhisattvas who have obtained tolerance with regard to phenomena, who are ready to remain in hell for immeasurable eons for the sake of each single sentient being, but whose virtuous Dharma conduct would [at the same time] not deteriorate the least through these sufferings.

The rDo sher ma summarises: “the bodhisattvas who have obtained ‘endurance’ are able to remain for limitless eons in the hell of unending torment for the sake of every single sentient being. For such [bodhisattvas] it is allowed [to engage in non-virtuous conduct in order to ripen the beings].” And: “if a single benefit of sentient beings arises because [a bodhisattva] bears the ripening for the sake of each sentient being, that is holding others more dear than oneself.” But how is that ‘endurance’ obtained, through which a bodhisattva is able to bear suffering and avoids at the same time the deterioration of the pure conduct? The rDo sher ma states:

The root of not losing the benefit of oneself and others like that is emptiness and compassion. Therefore, if one in this way familiarises oneself with the quintessence of emptiness and compassion, it occurs like that. Having obtained steadfastness with regard to that, even through the negative results of having engaged forcefully [e.g. engaged in killing], it occurs that the ripening and liberation of sentient beings is thereby caused. It is necessary that with regard to that one makes the root of emptiness and compassion stable.

Thus we can indeed speak of a ‘permission’ here, but only when the bodhisattva is able to bear the consequences of the non-virtuous deed that he performs in order to ripen and liberate sentient beings and only when the ensuing sufferings do not destroy the basis of his bodhisattvahood. An example of such an action is the killing of the deceptive merchant by the merciful captain. When the deceptive merchant is about to kill the other 500 merchants, the merciful captain kills him to prevent the ripening of the bad karma of killing 500 people in him. Thereby not only is the deceptive merchant now without that karma, but also no other person has to kill him and to bear the consequences. Yet the merciful captain himself has to bear the suffering of hell for committing a non-virtuous deed, and even when he is later born as the Buddha himself, a final consequence of that karma is that he pierces his foot with an acacia thorn (Skt. khacira).

It should be noted, however, that according to some later commentators not only did the merciful captain not commit a fault, but rather gathered plenty of merit (such an interpretation can be found e.g. in the Bodhisattvabhumi, Wogihara 166-9-12). But Jigten Gönpo does not follow that interpretation. Two things are certain for him in this context. Firstly, that the killing is necessarily a non-virtuous act, even though it is done out of a generally compassionate motivation. Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa states in the context of dGongs gcig 4.7: “If the great merciful captain, even though [his] motivation at the time of the cause is the benefit of beings, does not cultivate the motivation at the time [of the actual deed, namely] hatred, he cannot stab [with his] weapon.” Secondly it is clear for Jigten Gönpo that such an act must therefore have painful consequences for the bodhisattva. In this he can rely on a sutra from the Ratnakuta sutra collection, namely the Jñanottarabodhisattva-pariprccha-parivarta Mahayanasutra. ¹ As the story is told here (fol. 61r), the bodhisattva is well aware that killing the deceptive merchant he “will thereby burn for a hundred thousand eons in the hell of beings and experience the pains of the great hell of beings.” ² On the other hand, however, and in Jigten Gönpo’s understanding as a seperate unmixed result, the bodhisattva’s stay in samsara will be shortened by a hundred thousand eons through his skill in means and due to his great compassion. ³

The above mentioned interepretation in the Bodhisattvabhumi (which is not accepted by Jigten Gönpo) is somewhat similar to the one that can be found in the Arya Upayakaushalya Mahayanasutra, ⁴ which otherwise, however, does not seem to have played an important role in the Indian or Tibetan traditions. According to this text, the bodhisattva is again aware of the fact that he will burn in hell, ⁵ but a bit further down in the text, and in fact somewhat contradictory, the bodhisattva is said to have been backed up by a thousand eon’s experience in skill and compassion and that one should not think that he was obscured even by the least bit of karma. Yet the text continues to say “the Tathagata (who is the one to tell the story) [merely] revealed the workings of the beings’ karma.” ⁶ It remains unclear, however, what is meant by this last remark. Does the storyteller (the former bodhisattva himself, who is now the Buddha), mean to say that the negative karmic consequences occured, but were merely put on like a “show” for didactic purposes? And if that is the case, did the bodhisattva not suffer from the karma that he accumulated, but which apparently did not obscure him (i.e. caused his bodhisattvahood to deteroriate)? The Buddhist tradition does not agree on an interpretation of these incidents. Apparently the Mahasamghika tradition favours an interpretation according to which all incidents where a skilful means to save sentient beings, whereas the Mulasarvastivadin tradition accepted the existence of bad karma for the Buddha, albeit as mere faint echos of former bad deeds (such as the piercing of the Buddha’s foot with the acacia thorn). ⁷

However that may be, Upayakaushalyasutra appears to be a ‘developed version’ where the emphasis is on the superiority of the bodhisattva’s skills. It is in any case not the version that Jigten Gönpo bases his interpretation on and the sutra as such does not seem to play any role in India and Tibet (unless perhaps indirectly if it indeed has been the version that led to the Bodhisattvabhumis’ interpretation).

To sum up Jigten Gönpo’s view at this point, a bodhisattva may engage in non-virtuous behaviour to ripen others if he is able to bear all negative consequences and when those consequences do not destroy the basis of his bodhisattvahood. As a separate and unmixed result of the compassionate motivation and of the skilful ripening of sentient beings through such deeds, the bodhisattva’s own stay in samsara will be shortened immensely and he will be able to manifest as a fully awakened Buddha much sooner.

Jigten Gönpo’s view will become even more clear when we compare the merciful captain’s act of murder with other bodhisattvas’ deeds and their consequences mentioned by Jigten Gönpo. The difference between these acts and the merciful captain’s act is that they are “virtuous in the beginning, middle, and end,” and as such they have no negative consequences at all. The rDo sher ma states: “Through a [completely] virtuous mind the three poisons are absent and that, which is motivated by that, is taught to be free from faults.” This is stated here to contrast such completely skilful acts to the killing of the deceptive merchant, for which the merciful captain had to produce a moment of hatred in order to be able to stab the victim with a knife. An example for an act that is completely “virtuous in the beginning, middle, and end” is the king Kanakavarna’s merciful act during a twelve year famine in his kingdom. The rDo sher ma says:

The king Kanakavarna (Tib. rGyal-po gSer-mdog) did not become a thief. Since that king was the lord of all beings high [and low], he appropriated all their wealth. Therefore, having gathered all the wealth, the ones who [previously] had [wealth] were without many gods [afterwards], those who [previously] were without [wealth] were not caused to die from hunger, because [the king] took care of all of them alike, and apart from doing that, he did not gather wealth desiring it for himself. Since he gathered [wealth] only for these peoples’ benefit, it was solely a virtuous motivation, unmixed with the three poisons. Thus it was a faultless skilful conduct.

And our commentary summarises:

If [the motivation] is in that way not mixed with the three poisons, it is virtuous at the beginning, in the middle, and in the end, and the benefit of oneself and others arises in great measures. Since that doesn’t become a fault, it is permitted.

The crucial point of this story is, in Jigten Gönpo’s view, that Kanakavarna only apparently committed an act of thievery, but in reality he did not: foreseeing the twelve-year famine, he acted as a skilful statesman who simply collected a kind of a tax for the benefit of the whole society and didn’t keep anything for himself. Whereas the merciful captain would have to produce hatred in order to be able to stab the victim with the knife, the king did not need to produce desire in order to be able to collect the wealth. He did this purely with a virtuous motivation in the beginning, middle, and end, and thus was without any fault. As a consequence he only experienced the shortening of his stay in samsara, but no negative consequences whatsoever. ⁸ There are two other examples discussed in our commentaries: The brahmin Jyotis, who gave up celibacy for a girl that was extremely attached to him, and the Rishi Mes-byin, who did not speak the untruth, although it seemed so on the surface. Let it be only stated here that these acts where similarly virtuous in the beginning, middle, and end, and without all selfishness. They had therefore, like the king Kanakavaròa’s deed, only virtuous consequences. As such, these are the true skilful acts of bodhisattvas, because no non-virtue is committed for or results from them.

Thus when Jigten Gönpo states that “the ‘non-virtuous that does not become a fault’ is not permitted,” he means that there is no non-virtue that does not become a fault and hence such a thing (that is inexistent) can also not be permitted. There are certain bodhisattva acts that contain non-virtuous activities and are permitted, but only when they are committed in order to ripen beings and when their painful consequences can be endured by the bodhisattva without damaging the basis of his bodhisattvahood. True skilful bodhisattva acts, however, are virtuous in all respects and therefore have only virtuous results.

Notes
¹Arya Sarvabuddhamaharahasyopayakausalya Jñanottarabodhisattvapariprcchaparivarta Mahayanasutra (D vol. 44, no. 82, fols. 30r1-70v7; P vol. 24, no. 760/38, fols. 4v5-50v6; H vol. 40, fols. 79r6-139v7).

²Fol. 61r: ‘di ltar bdag gis mi ‘di srog dang phral na gzhi des bdag bskal pa ‘bum du sems can dmyal ba chen po rnams su sreg par ‘gyur yang bdag gis sems can dmyal ba chen po’i sdug bsngal myong bar ‘gyur ba.

³thabs la mkhas pa de dang/ snying rje chen po des bskal pa ‘bum du ‘khor ba bsnyil te bor bar gyur to/.

⁴Arya Upayakaushalya Mahayanasutra (‘Phags pa thabs mkhas pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo), P vol. 36, no. 927, fols. 298v3-327r6; D vol. 66, no. 261, 283v2-310r7.

⁵Fol 304r: gal te bdag gis mi ‘di srog dang dbral te/ de’i phyir bdag sems can dmyal bar skyes kyang bskal pa brgya stong du phyi phyir sems can dmyal ba chen por skyes bar bzod kyi/

⁶Fol. 304v: rigs kyi bu ngas ni thabs mkhas pa de dang snying rje chen po des bskal pa brgya phrag stong du ‘khor ba la rgyab kyis phyogs par byas so// mi de yang shi ‘phos nas mtho ris kyi ‘jig rten du skyes so// gang tshong pa lnga brgya po grur zhugs pa de dag ni phyis bskal pa bzang po la sangs rgyas lnga brgyar ‘byung ba’o// rigs kyi bu de ji snyam du sems/ gang gis bskal pa brgya phrag stong du thabs mkhas pa’i ye shes kyis ‘khor ba la rgyab kyis phyogs pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen po de la las kyi sgrib pa cung zad kyang yod dam/ rigs kyi bu khyod de ltar ma blta shig/ de bzhin gshegs pa ni sems can gyi las kyi bya ba ston to/

⁷See for a detailed study Guang Xing (2005) The Concept of the Buddha: Its Evolution from early Buddhism to the trikaya theory, London: Routledge, p. 106 ff.

⁸See the Kanakavarnasutra, which is part of the larger Divyavadana, Wilson (1856) “On Buddha and Buddhism,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland vol. 16, pp. 229-255, p. 242.

When I started this blog a few months ago, it was never my intention to get involved in ‘politics’ through my postings. Yet the following may have a potential for such an involvement. Let me state here right at the beginning, however, that H.H. the Dalai Lama’s statements only serve here for providing the occasion to discuss some doctrinal matters in the text under research, the Drikungpa’s dGongs gcig.

Three days ago, on October 23, 2012, H.H. the Dalai Lama stated on NBC: “I am quite certain that those who sacrificed their lives with sincere motivation, for Buddha dharma and for the well-being of the people, from the Buddhist or religious view points, is positive. But if these acts are carried out with full anger and hatred, then it is wrong. So it is difficult to judge. But it is really very sad, very very sad.” ¹

What H.H. the Dalai Lama is saying here is that, doctrinally speaking, to sacrifice one’s life “with sincere motivation, for Buddha dharma and for the well-being of the people … is positive.” Out of anger and hatred, however, it is wrong. He must have in mind the well known passage from the Abhidharmakosha, according to which (good or bad) karma is volition, i.e. a good volition leads to a positive result, whereas a bad volition must lead to a negative one.

But this is not the only doctrinal perspective.

The Dalai Lama himself is referring here to the “well-being of the people,” that is, he alludes to the mahayana doctrine of the bodhisattva who offers his body for the benefit of other beings. The well known Jataka stories of the monkey king who offers his body as a bridge to other monkeys (and dies) and the bodhisattva who offers his body as food to the starving tigress come to mind.

In the dGongs gcig the problem of offering one’s body and life is discussed in the connection of the “exchange of self and other.” An unnamed teacher is quoted with the words: “Out of compassion good aspirations are formed for the benefit of others and the suffering of others is exchanged for one’s own [happiness].” Jigten Gönpo’s remarks in this context (dGongs gcig 4.8): “There are cases where the exchange of the self and other is a fault.” When and why is that so?

First of all, in Jigten Gönpo’s view such a practise is not always a fault, but there are cases where it is a fault. He states that up to and including the level of the two bodhisattva paths of accumulation and preparation the bodhisattva carries out practical efforts for the benefit of others as much as he is able to, having first cultivated the vast power of motivation. Yet this is still the time when a practitioner must take care of himself through virtuous practise, because both the motivation and the skills of the bodhisattva are not firm enough. Once the bodhisattva has entered the path of seeing and progresses gradually up to the seventh bodhisattva level, both the motivation and the practise are increasing, until the motivation has become vastly cultivated and the practise is carried out to the greatest possible extend. This is then the time of the “equality of the self and others.” And from the eighth to the tenth bodhisattva level, both motivation and practise are of great power, the benefit of others is vastly accomplished, one is able to engage in the vast activities, the yogic discipline is very great, and one obtains also the great power for the enduring of suffering. Therefore, with combined motivation and practise of that sort it is now possible to engage in the practises of “vast liberality” (such as offering one’s life).

The reason not to engage in such practises at an earlier point of one’s bodhisattva career, says Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa, is that “if you have the wish to exchange self and other with small discriminating knowledge but great faith, it will become an obstacle, like the sickness of the lord Phagmodrupa, who suffered from constant headaches because of his former aspiration that the sufferings of others may always ripen in him. In the Bodhicaryavatara (86-87) it is said:

Do not harm for a trifle reason
the body that practises excellent Dharma!
(…)
Do not give your body
as long as your motivation of compassion remains impure!

To give you body and life prematurely is likened to the destruction of the seedling of a medical plant. If it is uprooted too early, its potential is completely lost. But, as Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa says, if one skilfully allows it to develop, when it is fully developed, the trunk, branches, leaves, petals, flowers, fruits, bark and so forth all turn into medicines that sustain immeasurable beings. Similarly, the bodhisattvas, too, must know the right occasion and must act skilfully. The illustration means according to the rDo sher ma that “if the new sprout of supreme awakening that has not [yet] become the powerful resolve for awakening turns into a deterioration of the resolve for awakening and an impediment on the path through untimely exchange of oneself and others, it is an impediment for the medicine that removes all samsaric suffering through supreme awakening, for the [wish fulfilling] tree that annihilates all poverty, and for the [precious jewel that is the] source of all that is necessary and desired, and therefore it is taught that one has to guard against untimely practises.” If the beginning bodhisattva loses the path due to the pain that he experiences through the offering in this life and because his rebirth is not one where the bodhisattva path can be practised, he destroys through his one compassionate deed his whole potential: He acts with great faith but little discriminating knowledge.

Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa provides a story that is a drastic illustration of this point. Earlier, he says, Arya Shariputra cultivated the resolve for supreme awakening and while he was practising the conduct of bodhisattvas for many eons, at one occasion one person said: “Give one of your eyes to me!” Thus he took out one of his eyes and gave it to that person. Then that person placed one foot on top of it and squashed it. [Shariputra said]: “Why did you do that?” [The person replied]: “I wanted it to make the sound ‘squash.’” Shariputra became very downcast and thinking that there was nothing he could do for these beings, he grew frustrated. When this petty thought arose, he became a shravaka [again].

The rDo sher ma mentions that Shariputra was on the sixth bodhisattva level at that time. The text states that even up to the seventh level one is not able at all to bear that kind of suffering and that therefore the exchange of self and others will be a fault. It furthermore states: “If someone who has not obtained the tolerance [i.e. the ability to bear the sufferings] wishes to perform the benefit of others, he needs to investigate whether he should form that aspiration or not by way of five reasons. (1) Is something like that the intention of the excellent guru [referring here to Phagmodrupa] or not? (2) Does that dedication match the resolve or not? (3) Is the aspiration, when one forms it, achieved or not? (4) If it is achieved, can one bear it or not? (5) Apart from that, are there other means or not?” The text explains these five points as follows. (1) It is not the heart intention of Phagmodrupa, since he himself experienced problems from premature aspirations (as mentioned above). (2) If one is overpowered by the accumulations of sufferings and faults and the former aspiration thus turns into the “impediment of goodness,” the dedication does not match the resolve “[may it] cause the obtainment of Buddhahood for myself and all others.” (3) Since the Mañjushribuddhakshetragunavyuha Mahayanasutra (Derge, vol. 41, passage not identified) says:

All phenomena depend entirely
on the goal of one’s striving as [their] condition;
whichever aspiration one forms,
a result like that will be obtained—

the aspiration will always be accomplished. (4) Even up to the seventh level one is not able at all to bear the suffering of others. Therefore the exchange of self and others will be a fault. (5) If one possesses great discriminating knowledge, other means exist. According to the Rin byang ma: “We [in our tradition] engage in these aspirations and practises having familiarised to the ‘taking as path’ and to the precious resolve for awakening, when we have obtained the great compassion of the ultimate level that cannot deteriorate through unfavourable conditions and when we have realised the sameness of all phenomena at the time of being someone like the lord Avalokiteshvara and Mañjushrikumara.” Both the rDo sher ma and the Rin byang ma state also a story where a girl is born in hell with a burning iron wheel on her head and 166,000 years ahead to bear that pain. Experiencing that pain she spontaneously formed the aspiration that others with the same karma should not have to experience this pain through her own taking of that pain upon herself. That is to say: she knew well what she was doing and her act was a spontaneous act of compassion. As a consequence of that wish the wheel rose up and she was freed from that suffering and reborn in Tushita. ²

Returning now to the discussion of self-immolation in present day Tibet and China, I too feel very sad about the loss of so many lives. There is certainly a heroic aspect in giving one’s life for one’s people. And since this causes so many deep emotions among the Tibetans, I can understand that the Dalai Lama doesn’t really have a chance to criticise these deeds. But on the background of the above doctrinal discussion in the commentaries of the dGongs gcig I wonder whether the reference to good volitions leading to good results fully exhausts the full range of doctrinal issues regarding the offering of one’s own life.

I wish the Tibetans could find other means of protest than destroying their own lives, and I can only hope that those who do it nonetheless are not doing it simply out of sheer desperation.

Notes

¹http://tibet.net/2012/10/23/nbc-interviews-his-holiness-the-dalai-lama-on-self-immolation-tragedy-in-tibet/

²For the story of Maitranyaka, see John Brough (1957) “Some Notes on Maitrakanyaka: Divyavadana XXXVIII,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 20, No. 1/3, Studies in Honour of Sir Ralph Turner, Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 1937-57, pp. 111-132.